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ABSTRACT 
It has been observed that South Africa's lump sum unconditional transfer to 
municipalities, known as the Local Government Equitable Share (LES), has been 
gradually increasing at a higher rate than operating revenue from service charges 
and property tax. The key objectives of the LES is to assist municipalities in funding 
their administrative and governance functions, as well as to enable municipalities 
to provide more quality goods and services by supplementing operating revenue. 
Despite the increase in LES observed by municipalities, South Africa has seen an 
annual rise in service delivery protests and debt owed to municipalities for services 
provided. Such trends raise questions about the efficiencies in local government 
revenue mobilisation and performance. This minor dissertation intends to assess 
the impact, if any, that the LES grant has on municipal own revenue generation. 
More specifically, the research aims to understand whether the increasing LES 
allocation contributes to municipalities forgoing their revenue collection 
responsibilities, offering tax breaks to their constituents or increasing tax collection 
efforts. This minor dissertation contributes to literature within this field by 
introducing municipal consumer debt as an additional measure of local revenue 
performance, improving the robustness of the analysis. The analysis uses a panel 
dataset consisting of 127 South African municipalities for the municipal financial 
period of 2004/05 to 2015/16. To undertake this analysis, fixed effects and random 
effect panel estimation techniques were employed. The estimation results find that 
the LES is statically significant and positively correlated to municipal operating 
revenue. The analysis also finds that the LES has no statistically significant 
relationship with municipal consumer debt. This suggests that the LES may not 
have contributed to poor local tax collection and revenue mobilisation over the 
period. 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
This minor dissertation investigates the effect of the local government equitable 
share grant (LES) on local governments’ own revenue collection in a South African 
context. This minor dissertation asks whether the increase in LES has contributed 
to a decline in local revenue performance. This introductory chapter sets the 
context to the observed trend in local revenue mobilisation and performance in 
relation to LES grants. 
1.2 Context 
The Republic of South Africa is a unitary state and constitutional democracy with 
a three-tier system of governance as well as an independent judiciary. The three-
tier system is comprised of national, provincial, and local government – all of which 
have their own legislative and executive authority (Republic of South Africa, 2019). 
This minor dissertation is specifically concerned with the functions of local 
government and its relationship to the national government. South Africa has a 
total of 257 municipalities, consisting of a mixture of metropolitan, district and the 
level of local government (National Treasury Municipal Finance Data, 2019). 
Amongst four other objects, local government is constitutionally mandated “to 
promote social and economic development” (Republic of South Africa, 1996:7). 
Municipalities thus play a key role in poverty alleviation and economic 
development. The country’s constitution further states that municipalities ought to 
“strive within [their financial] and administrative capacit[ies] to achieve their objects 
(ibid). They are mandated to deliver basic services and invest in infrastructure and 
resources that foster social and economic development (National Treasury, 2008).  
To undertake their operational and strategic mandate, municipalities must 
generate revenue. This can be through property rates, service charges, fines, and 
government issued grants (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Property rates are 
taxes that owners of land and buildings are required to pay to the municipality 
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within which said property is located. Service charges are fees that municipalities 
charge customers for the provision of services rendered (National Treasury, 2008). 
The four basic services are water, electricity, sewage and refuse. According to 
Chapter 7, Section 152 of the Constitution, one of the main objectives of the local 
government is to provide the above basic services to its constituency in a 
sustainable manner. Given the importance of these services, it can be argued that 
provision of these services is a municipalities most important function (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996). 
Not all municipalities are mandated to provide these services and others, 
depending on their capacity, can provide more or less than the four basic services, 
such as public access to WiFi connectivity. Fines are a smaller source of revenue 
compared to property rates and service charges. Fines consist of monetary 
remediation paid to municipalities instances were municipality bylaws are broken 
or traffic rules are not observed by those within the jurisdiction of the municipality 
(National Treasury, 2008). In addition to the four basic services, schedule 4B and 
5B of the Constitution provide a list of services whose provision is assigned to 
municipalities (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Services listed under schedules 4B 
and 5B include the provision of beaches and amusement facilities, municipal 
airports and firefighting services. Through the fees and levies associated with 
providing these services, municipalities are able to recover some revenue, albeit 
not as substantial as the income derived from providing the four basic services. 
Another avenue through which municipalities fund their expenditures is through 
grants from national and, to a lesser extent, provincial government. These 
intergovernmental transfers come in the form of conditional and unconditional 
grants. Conditional grants are those provided by a national department or 
provincial department that restrict the recipient municipalities to certain limitations 
in terms of spending. Conditional grants are often used for municipal capital 
spending aimed at achieving national policy priorities or on building capacity and 
systems to ensure municipalities can achieve their mandates (Financial and Fiscal 
Commission, 2000).  
Of key interest to this minor dissertation are unconditional grants. In South Africa, 
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the most significant unconditional grant available to municipalities is known as the 
Local Government Equitable Share (LES) which is a constitutional entitlement of 
local government. The LES is a grant which municipalities receive as a lump-sum. 
The amount that each municipality receives is not equal; it is determined by a 
number of factors set out in the allocation formula, such as the number of indigent 
households within a municipality (South African Local Government Association, 
2012). The most important element of this grant is that municipalities are given full 
autonomy on how to use their portion of the lump-sum grant. The main objectives 
of the LES grant is to “enable municipalities to provide basic services to poor 
households” as well as to “enable under resourced municipalities to afford basic 
governance and administrative capabilities to better support performance of core 
municipal functions” (South African Local Government Association, 2012:6). 
1.3 Problem statement 
It has been observed that the LES as share of local operating revenue from local 
taxes, fees and service charges, has been gradually increasing over the 2004 to 
2015. Within the same time period, there has been an increase on average in the 
number of municipalities funding their budgets with the LES (Mahabir, 2014). Even 
though revenue derived from service charges and property rates continue to be a 
municipality's main source of operating revenue on average, the share of service 
charges and property rates as a percentage municipal operating revenue have 
been declining (Mahabir, 2014). 
One possible explanation suggests that municipalities no longer see this 
unconditional grant as a means to supplement revenue loss from non-economically 
active or indigent base or budgetary shortfalls; it is ostensibly perceived as a 
substitute for their own revenue generating responsibilities. The “fly paper effect” 
is another plausible explanation for this trend.  It occurs when municipalities offer 
tax breaks to their constituents as a result of receiving larger grants from national 
government (Hines & Thaler, 1995; Inman, 2008) In such instances, the increase 
in grants may lead to a decrease in own revenue, not as a result of inefficiencies, 
but rather as planned by the municipality. Although the fly paper effect may be 
plausible in some instances, it does not account for the accompanied rise in 
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municipal service delivery protests.  
According to Municipal IQ, an organisation that specialises in collating data and 
intelligence at local government level, service delivery protests in 2018 reached a 
13-year high (Municipal Focus, 2018; Independent Online, 2019; Times Live, 
2019). As figure 1 shows, there have been more than 500 estimated municipal 
service delivery protests in the past three years. In 2018 there were 237 service 
protests, a 37 percent increase from 2017. Over the three-year period, municipal 
service delivery protests increased annually by approximately 20 percent on 
average.  
Figure 1: Number of municipal service delivery protests 
 
Source: Municipal IQ – Municipal Hotspots Monitor, 2019 
Increasing service delivery protests in South Africa against the backdrop of larger 
LES allocations to municipalities raise concern over municipalities’ failure to 
optimise the suite of revenue options available to them to efficiently and effectively 
deliver services to communities (Municipal Focus, 2018). Given the discussions 
above, one needs to question the effectiveness of municipal own revenue 
collection in the face of increasing transfers from national government, in the form 
of the LES allocations.  
1.4 Research question 
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Against the backdrop of an increasing share of LES as a percentage of local own 
revenue as discussed above, this minor dissertation intends to assess the impact, 
if any, that the LES grant has on municipal own revenue generation. More 
specifically, the research aims to understand whether the increasing LES allocation 
contributes to municipalities forgoing their revenue collection responsibilities, 
offering tax breaks to their constituents or increasing tax collection efforts. In order 
to robustly answer the primary objective of this minor dissertation, as sub objective 
is assessed to complement the primary research objective. The sub objective 
follows an assessment of the impact of the LES on municipal consumer debt. This 
assessment is undertaken using a panel dataset spanning 12 financial periods 
from 2004/05 to 2015/16 and includes all metropolitan and local municipalities that 
provide all four basic services. The minor dissertation uses standard panel data 
estimation techniques, in the form of fixed effects and random effects estimations, 
with tests for endogeneity. 
1.5 Contribution and significance of research 
While there are a number of studies that have looked at the impact of 
intergovernmental grants on local own revenue internationally (see Masaki, 2018; 
Bravo, 2013; Caldeira & Rota Graziosia, 2014; Dahlberg, 2008; Brun & El Khdari, 
2016; Mogues & Benin, 2011; Zhuravskaya, 2000; Buettner, 2006 Cardenas & 
Sharma, 2009; Sanogo & Brun, 2016; Wildasin, 2009), no studies in South Africa, 
to the authors best knowledge, have used a panel data set and panel estimation 
techniques to explore the impact of the LES on local own revenue. Therefore, this 
minor dissertation directly contributes to the limited body of research in a South 
African context by developing a novel municipal panel dataset assessing the 
impact of the LES on local own revenue generation using fixed and random effect 
panel techniques. 
The nature of studies that assess the impact of intergovernmental transfers on 
local revenue generation tend to focus solely on the impact of intergovernmental 
grants on municipal expenditure and revenues collected (Mogues & Benin, 2011; 
Bravo, 2013; Caldeira & Rota Graziosia, 2014). This minor dissertation includes 
municipal consumer debt as an additional measure of local revenue performance, 
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improving the robustness of intergovernmental analysis. 
Understanding the relationship between the LES and local revenue performance 
in South Africa is essential given local government's constitutionally mandated role 
in service delivery. The LES was formulated to correct for fiscal imbalances at the 
local level that constraints revenue generation and service delivery. Therefore, if 
an increase in service delivery protests, and an increase in municipal consumer 
debt is observed, while LES as a share of operating revenue is rising, it is important 
to investigate if the LES is performing the role that it was intended to. South Africa 
is characterised by slow economic growth with prevailing socio-economic issues 
that place immense pressures on the fiscus, therefore instigations into revenue 
performance municipalities with respect to the LES allows policy makers to make 
informed decisions around the allocation frameworks and grant formula designs of 
intergovernmental transfers. 
1.6 Structure of the minor dissertation 
Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive overview of the local government funding 
framework in South Africa. It analyses the evolution of the LES since its inception, 
and then does a brief overview of the key issues and considerations relating to 
municipalities’ revenue and debt management. Chapter 3 presents the literature 
review from both the theoretical and empirical perspectives. The research question 
with which this minor dissertation is concerned is situated within existing literature. 
Chapter 4 focuses on methodology. It presents the methods and data sources 
used and then describes the variables and models specified and the descriptive 
statistics. Chapter 5 is a detailed discussion about the results estimated from the 
models. Finally, Chapter 6 will present the conclusion that will compare the findings 
presented in other studies to this dissertation, as well as providing relevant policy 
implications arising from this study. 
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2 Chapter 2: Funding of Local Government and Consumer Debt 
Management 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a comprehensive overview of the conceptualisation and 
practical implementation of the LES since its inception in order to understand the 
evolution of the grant. This chapter also includes aggregate trends on municipal 
revenue generation and consumer debt. 
2.2 Overview of the configuration and expenditure assignment of South 
African local government 
In Chapter 7, Section 155 of South Africa's Constitution, three broad categories of 
municipalities can be established in a South African context, namely category A, B 
and C municipalities (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Category A municipalities 
are known as "metropolitan municipalities".  What differentiates these 
municipalities from category B (local) municipalities and category C (district) 
municipalities is that they have exclusive executive and legislative authority in their 
municipal boundary (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Category B and C 
municipalities share municipal executive and legislative authority. District 
municipalities comprise of multiple local municipalities with their physical 
boundaries (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Metropolitan municipalities are stand-
alone municipalities that do not fall under the boundaries of district municipalities, 
nor do they have any local municipalities within their boundaries.  
The Constitution gives powers to National legislation to establish means, 
procedures and criteria for determining physical boundaries for all municipalities. 
In 1998, The Municipal Demarcation Act No. 27 was promulgated and an 
independent authority, The Municipal Demarcation Board, was established to 
determine these boundaries (Municipal Demarcation Board, 2019). Since the 
enactment of the legislation above, South Africa's municipal complement has 
undergone various consolidation and restructuring. As of the most recent municipal 
demarcation changes in 2016, there are 8 metropolitan municipalities, 205 local 
municipalities and 44 district municipalities (CoGTA, 2016). 
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In terms of local government expenditure assignments, municipalities are 
constitutionally mandated to provide basic services for their constituents, namely: 
water, electricity, refuse and waste. In addition to the above, schedule 4B and 5B 
under Chapter 7, Section 155 of the Constitution states that the following items 
and services are considered “local government matters” (Republic of South Africa, 
1996). Under Schedule 4B are building regulations; child care facilities; electricity 
and gas reticulation; firefighting services; local tourism;  municipal airports; 
municipal planning; municipal health services; municipal public transport; 
municipal public works only in respect of the needs of municipalities in the 
discharge of their responsibilities to administer functions specifically assigned to 
them under the constitution or any other law; pontoons, ferries, piers and harbours, 
excluding the regulation of international and national shipping, and matters related 
thereto; stormwater management systems in built-up areas; and trading 
regulations (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Schedule 5B considers beaches and 
amusement facilities; billboards and the display of advertisements in public places; 
cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria; cleansing; control of public 
nuisances; control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public; facilities for the 
accommodation, care and burial of animals; fencing and fences; licensing of dogs; 
licensing and control of undertakings that sell food to the public; local sport 
facilities; markets; municipal parks and recreation, municipal roads, public spaces, 
street trading, traffic and parking (Republic of South Africa, 1996).  
All categories of municipalities may provide the services above, but in the instance 
of district municipalities and local municipalities within the same municipal 
boundaries, the provision and associated functions and powers must be divided 
between the one or more local municipalities and respective district municipality 
within the boundary (Republic of South Africa, 1996). In a South African context, 
the cost to provide these services are embedded within a municipality's operating 
expenditure. Municipal operating expenditures include staff costs, collection costs, 
purchases of material and repair and maintenance. Figure 2 provides an aggregate 
picture of operating expenditure at the local government level for the 2016/17 
financial year. Within that financial year, aggregate operating expenditure 
amounted to R330 billion at the local level. The highest operating expenditure 
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components relate to staff costs and bulk costs for infrastructure upgrades. 
Figure 2: Aggregate municipal operating expenditure in 2016/17 (R’billions) 
 
Source: Authors own analysis from National Treasury Municipal Finance Dataset 
2.3 Overview of local revenue assignment 
The Constitution mandates that municipalities must not only provide the services 
mentioned above but provide them in sustainable manner (Republic of South 
Africa, 1996). In order to fund municipal expenditures in a sustainable manner, 
municipalities have various avenues for revenue assigned to them. When 
compared to provincial government, municipalities have a wider range of revenue 
streams assigned to them by the Constitution (National Treasury, 2011). The 
revenue streams available to municipalities include surcharges on service charges; 
levies; fines; property rates and duties (National Treasury, 2011). Municipalities 
are also expected to charge fees for the provision of services, unlike provincial 
government. In order to provide services in a sustainable manner, that is, to cover 
their planned expenditure outlay, municipalities also have access to government 
grants as an additional revenue assignment to supplement a shortfall in service 
provision (National Treasury, 2011).  
Municipal revenue falls into two categories: municipal operating revenue and 
municipal capital revenue. Municipal operating revenue is revenue derived from 
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the day-to-day operations of the municipality and is therefore associated with 
service delivery. All of the revenue sources mentioned above are associated with 
municipal operating revenue. Municipal capital revenue is revenue associated with 
long term projects. The main sources of capital revenue are the following: external 
loans from financial institutions; conditional grants for specific capital projects; local 
and foreign donors (National Treasury, 2011). These revenue assignments are 
typically not used for day-to-day operations and service delivery hence this minor 
dissertation's focus on operating revenue.  
Figure 3: Aggregate municipal operating expenditure in 2016/17 (R’billions) 
 
Source: Authors own analysis from National Treasury Municipal Finance Dataset 
Figure 3 illustrates the revenue sources received at local level for the 2016/17 
financial year. A total of R355 billion was received by municipalities in the financial 
year. Revenue from services charges represented the largest share of local 
revenue, followed by government grants and property rates. 
2.4 Overview of the division of revenue process and linkages with the 
local government fiscal framework 
Chapter 13, section 214 (1) of the Constitution states that an act of parliament must 
provide for an equitable division of revenue raised nationally among the national, 
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provincial and local spheres of government (Republic of South Africa, 1996). The 
local government sphere was first included in the division of revenue process in 
1999. The division of revenue is important as it recognises the disparity between 
national, provincial and local government, in terms of their responsibilities and 
capacities to perform said responsibilities (National Treasury, 2011b).  
Such disparity is referred to as a fiscal imbalance, as municipalities’ expenditure 
assignments associated with services, they deliver are larger than the revenue 
they make. Section 14 of the Constitution makes allowance for the allocation of 
conditional and unconditional transfers from national government to provincial and 
local government. These allocations are made through the annual Division of 
Revenue Act. The table below tabulates the division of revenue amongst three 
spheres of government for the 2016/17 financial year. 
Table 1: Division of Revenue for 2016/17 (R'000) 
 
Source: 2016 Division of Revenue Bill, Republic of South Africa 2016 
The act specifies a baseline for the division of conditional and unconditional 
transfers, as well as clauses regulating and governing these transfers (National 
Treasury, 2011b). Section 214(2) of the Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 
1996) also stipulates that the following factors need to be considered within the 
division of revenue process: 
a) national interest 
b) any provision that must be made in respect of national debt and other 
obligations 
c) the needs and interests of the national government determined by objective 
criteria 
d) the need to ensure that the provinces and municipalities are able to provide 
Spheres of Government Share of revenue % Share Share of revenue % Share Share of revenue % Share
National 855 070 793R          64,9% 922 857 273R          64,9% 1 003 451 247R       65,2%
Provincial 410 698 585R          31,2% 441 831 122R          31,1% 474 851 942R          30,8%
Local 52 568 706R            4,0% 57 012 141R            4,0% 61 731 845R            4,0%
TOTAL 1 318 338 084R       100% 1 421 700 536R       100% 1 540 035 034R       100%
2016/17 2017/18 2018/19
Forward Estimates
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basic services and perform the functions allocated to them 
e) the fiscal capacity and efficiency of the provinces and municipalities 
f) developmental and other needs of provinces, local government and 
municipalities 
g) economic disparities within and among provinces 
h) obligations of the provinces and municipalities in terms of national legislation 
i) the desirability of stable and predictable allocations of revenue shares 
j) the need for flexibility in responding to emergencies, other temporary needs, 
and other factors based on similar objective criteria 
The LES is local government's unconditional share of the division of revenue. It is 
distributed through a formula that has undergone some change since its first 
iteration. The evolution of the LES is expanded on in the next sub-chapter. 
2.5 Overview of the local government equitable share 
The LES is an unconditional lump-sum grant that is provided by national 
government to municipalities for the purposes of compensating for revenue that 
municipalities cannot generate themselves in order to deliver their mandate 
according to section 227 of the Constitution (National Treasury, 2016). The LES 
allows municipalities to better "deliver free basic services to poor households and 
[it] subsidises the cost of administration and other core services for those 
municipalities that have the least potential to cover these costs from their own 
revenue" (National Treasury, 2016). 
The LES formula is currently in its third iteration, the first iteration of the formula 
was introduced in 1998/1999, the second iteration of the formula was introduced 
in 2005/2006 and the current iteration of the formula was introduced in 2013/2014. 
Both the second and third iteration of the LES formula were preceded by an 
extensive review process.  
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As alluded to above, in the financial year of 1998/99, the first iteration of the LES 
formula was introduced in a document titled, "Introducing an Equitable Share of 
Nationally Raised Revenue for Local Government" (National Treasury, 2012a). 
The original formula was built on the following principals and objectives: 
• transparent transfers from national government that promote efficiency, 
equity and economic growth. 
• transfers that support local government’s institutional capacity and 
development. 
The main objectives of the LES were to supplement municipalities’ operational 
costs as capital expenditure was to be funded through a combination of conditional 
grants, borrowing and own revenue generated (National Treasury, 2012a). The 
objectives of the original LES formula also recognise that municipalities are 
expected to raise some of their own revenue, although it does take into account 
the fact that municipalities have varying ability to generate their own revenue based 
on a number of factors, such as size of economic base (National Treasury, 2012a). 
In terms of the actual mechanics of the first iteration of the LES formula, the 
Department of Finance introduced a formula-based approach to the distribution 
and allocation of funds to local government to ensure that allocations were 
"transparent, scientific, objective and beyond manipulation by policy makers or 
municipalities" (National Treasury, 2012b). The overall formula consisted of four 
grant components, namely: 
• The basic services grant; 
• the municipal institution grant; 
• the tax base equalisation grant; and 
• the matching grant. 
The basic services sub grant (S) was developed in order to assist in providing 
municipalities with the financial capabilities in servicing poor households with the 
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basic services as described in the Constitution (National Treasury, 2012b). The 
original LES formula defined poor households as those collectively expending 
below R1100 per month. Municipalities were then subsidised the cost of basic 
services based on the number of households expending less than the above 
threshold per month (National Treasury, 2012b).  
The municipal institution (I) sub grant component essentially helps to supplement 
cost associated with the political and institutional aspect of municipalities. 
According to the National Treasury (2012b) in its allocation, this sub grant 
component took into account the following factors in its allocation: a municipality's 
administrative operation costs given its population size, and its ability to fund its 
administrative function from the revenue it generates (National Treasury, 2012b). 
The tax base equalisation grant is a sub grant designed for the purposes of 
minimising any fiscal disparities within the existing substructures of municipalities. 
Finally, the matching grant component of the original LES formula was developed 
to "address the impacts of inter-jurisdictional externalities that might arise from the 
provision of services" (National Treasury, 2016b). 
Despite the development of the four sub components of the original LES formula 
as described above, only the municipal institution and basic services component 
of the formula funded and allocated across local government during its inception 
year of 1998/99. Following this, the tax base equalisation grant was not 
implemented removed from the formula because of fundamental changes in 
metropolitan municipalities that made this sub grant obsolete (National Treasury, 
2012b). The matching grant component was also subsequently removed from the 
formula as inter jurisdictional externalities could not be measured accurately 
(National Treasury, 2012b).  
The first iteration of the LES formula experienced more change since its inception 
- one of the biggest changes was the expansion of the LES to also include funding 
of former R293 towns. R293 towns is a term that refers to the inferior and dense 
townships in former bantu areas. The funding of former R293 towns was originally 
a provincial function, but funding responsibility had since transferred to 
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municipalities located in the former homeland areas (National Treasury (2012b). 
Another inclusion to the LES formula was funding allocation to nodal priority 
programs in 2001/02. This funding window related to specific programs within the 
specified nodal areas. 
Figure 4 :LES formula allocation, First iteration of the formula, 2004 allocation (R'000) 
 
Source: National Treasury, 2012. LES discussion paper. 
As the figure above indicates, following the inclusion of allocations to special nodal 
programs and funding of former R293 towns, the basic services sub grant 
component still represented the largest share of the total allocation municipalities 
with 67% (National Treasury, 2012b). The remaining 33% of the LES formula 
allocation in 2004 (the final year of the first iteration) was made up of the municipal 
institution grant (7%); R293 allocation (4%); nodal allocations (3%) and the FBS 
grants for free basic services (19%). 
The second iteration of the LES formula that was introduced in 2005/06 and was 
designed with the same set of principles and objectives as those in the original 
formula. The review process that gave birth to the second iteration of the LES 
formula found the following concerns with the original formula (National Treasury, 
2012b): 
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• The original formula consisted of funding windows, which was considered 
problematic as this had negative effect on the equity and objectivity of the 
grant. 
• It was suggested that the original formula was not transparent and difficult 
to understand. 
• From a structural and policy perspective, the local government environment 
is in a constant state of change, reviewers of the original formula felt that it 
was too rigid to deal with the need for additional funding windows. 
The second iteration of the LES of formula underwent regular modification over its 
lifespan, some of the notable changes between 2005 - 2013 include the following 
(National Treasury, 2012b).: 
• modification of the institutional sub grant component to replace the 
population escalation factor with a poverty factor and the reweighting of the 
basic services subsidies for serviced and non-serviced households. 
• the inclusion of municipal health services as part of the funding of basic 
services. 
• Adjustments in measuring the revenue raising capacity correction 
component, coinciding with the introduction of a differentiated tax system 
within the RRC component. 
The formula for the second iteration of the LES formula is described in the equation 
below (National Treasury, 2012b). 
LES = BS + I + D - RRC ± C 
where: 
BS = Basic Services Component 
I = Institutional component 
D = Development component 
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RRC = Revenue Raising Capacity Correction Component 
C = Correction and Stabilisation Factor 
The basic services component was the largest across all municipality types. The 
second largest was the institutional component, except metropolitan municipalities 
as they typically experience a large amount reduced due to the revenue raising 
capacity correction component (RRC), whereas rural municipalities experience no 
reduction to their RRC.  
In comparison to the original LES formula, the basic services component within the 
second iteration of the grant had taken on a greater share of the total LES 
allocation as it now includes municipal health services with the cost of free basic 
services (water, electricity, refuse and sanitation). The institutional support 
component has generally remained unchanged in terms of its characteristics, 
account for 7.9 percent in the second iteration of the formula (National Treasury, 
2012b). 
With respect to the newly introduced development component of the second 
iteration of the LES formula, the National Treasury (2012b) suggest that this facility 
largely remained dormant. The dormancy of the development component is in part 
due to the fact that development within the local government level is funded in 
multiple ways, such as conditional grants for infrastructure development in poverty-
stricken communities. 
The rationale behind the revenue raising capacity (RRC) component of the LES 
formula is that municipalities have variable revenue generating capabilities. This 
component aims to offer greater financial support to municipalities with lesser 
revenue generating abilities by deducting 7.4 percent of the total LES from well 
capacitated municipalities and transferring it to the coffers of the poorer 
municipalities.  
Lastly, the second iteration of the LES formula, as equation above indicates, had 
a correction and stabilisation component that applied a factor to ensure that 
guarantees with respect to the formula will be achieved. Therefore, this component 
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of the LES component could be an addition or subtraction depending on the 
residual proportion of the final LES allocations (National Treasury, 2012b). 
Prior to the introduction of the third iteration of the LES formula, the working group 
responsible for its review, examined the principles and objectives that underpin the 
first and second version of the LES formula and found that a lot of them were 
lacked present relevance given the current context of the local government 
environment. According to National Treasury (2012b), other areas of concern in 
the second iteration of the LES formula included the following: 
• Despite assertions that development was funded through equitable share, 
the development component remained dormant 
• The nature of the LES formula seemed to be biased towards municipality's 
with larger populations. 
• It was suggested that there was little improvement from the first iteration of 
LES with respect to transparency and understandability of the mechanics 
around the allocation process. 
• The expectation that municipal level data can be updated regularly is an 
impractical one, and as such, the local equitable share does not do a good 
job of capturing the service delivery progress between censuses. 
• It is suggested that the RRC correction component of the formula does not 
accurately enough measure revenue generating or fiscal capacity, given that 
it is based on past revenue data. 
• In terms of the two main components, the review suggests that the 
institutional component is inadequately funded, and that there were no 
proper cost analysis of basic services. Maintenance costs of basic services 
are seemingly not considered. 
• The second iteration of the LES formula utilised a narrow definition of 
poverty. 
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As suggested above, the current LES formula was introduced in 2013/14. The 
current LES formula uses a combination of socio economic and demographic data 
to determine each municipality’s LES allocation (National Treasury, 2016). The 
current LES formula is illustrated in the structural equation below: 
LES = BS + (I + CS) * RA +/- C 
where: 
BS = basic services component 
I = Institutional component 
CS = community service component 
RA = revenue adjustment factor 
C = correction and stabilisation factor 
Basic Services Component 
BS = Basic services subsidy x no. of poor households 
The basic services component has undergone some revision since the second 
iteration of the LES formula. The affordability threshold consisted of households 
expending less than R1100, following broad consultations with municipalities, the 
updated measure of affordability is derived from two state old age pensions 
(National Treasury, 2016). At the time of 2011 census, the state pension figure was 
a monthly figure of R1140, which essentially means that if a household had two   
pensioners, it would be worth R2280 per month (National Treasury, 2016). Given 
the above, for the new formula a monthly household income threshold, based on 
2011 data, of R2300 was used to define the new affordability threshold (National 
Treasury, 2016). Considering that over 50 percent of South African households fall 
below this level according to Statistics SA, the above household income threshold 
should not be confused with an official poverty line. This household income 
threshold merely forms part of a suggested guideline for municipalities, as they can 
ultimately decide to support fewer households with basic services than funded for 
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by the LES, based on their internal indigent policies. The rationale for such a 
material decision needs to be well documented in their budget document with a 
note on the extent of consultation with the community during the budgetary process 
(National Treasury, 2016). In financial year of 2016/17, the basic services subsidy 
funded a total of 9.2 million households. 
Institutional Component 
I = base allocation + (allocation per councillor X no. of council seats) 
The intentions of the institutional component of the LES formula has largely 
remained unchanged over the evolution of the formula. As the equation above 
suggests, the institutional component consists of a base allocation, valued R5.9 
million. This basic allocation goes to all municipalities. The rationale is that there 
are fixed costs associated with administration and institutional support that all 
municipalities are faced with (National Treasury, 2016). Similar to previous 
iterations of the institutional component of the LES formula, an amount is then 
calculated based on number of councillors a municipality has, as it is suggestive 
that this is indicative of the size of a municipality's administration. The formula used 
to determine number of councillor seats recognised is determined by the 
Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) (National 
Treasury, 2016). 
Community Service Component 
CS = (municipal health and related services allocation * no of households) 
+ (other services allocation * no. of households) 
The vague and underutilised development component that characterised the 
previous iterations of the LES formula has been replaced by the community 
services component. This component provides funding for services that benefit 
communities at large, irrespective of the nature of the households that make up 
these communities. According to the National Treasury (2016), some of the eligible 
community services include storm water management, municipal roads, parks, 
cemeteries, health services, street lights and fire services. Municipalities with a 
lower ability to generate revenue receive higher percentages of this sub 
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component. 
The intent of both the revenue adjustment factor and the correction and 
stabilisation factor have generally remained the same since the last iteration. The 
calculation of the revenue adjustment factor has become more robust in 
determining fiscal capacities across municipalities, as a result of the negative 
feedback of this component in the previous iteration of the LES. This adjustment 
factor is based on per capita data from the Census 2011 and considers the 
following indicators for a municipality’s per capita revenue raising potential 
(National Treasury, 2016).: 
• Unemployment rate 
• Total income 
• No. of households on traditional land. 
• Poor households as percentage of total households 
Looking at the above indicators, one can observe that this component is not based 
on the actual revenue data from municipalities as the potential disadvantage of this 
is that it could create perverse incentives for municipalities to perform poorly in 
order to maximise of their factor allocation (National Treasury, 2016). 
2.6 Brief overview of consumer debt management 
The section above provided an overview of the LES from inception to its current 
iteration. As previously mentioned, the LES is an important source of revenue for 
municipalities given the role it plays poverty alleviation and economic development. 
As discussed above, municipalities also derive revenue from other sources but 
even with the availability of various revenue sources, municipalities can still be 
constrained in generating optimal own revenue levels due to the non-payment on 
some of the above revenue sources, also known as municipal consumer debt 
(Financial and Fiscal Commission, 2012).  
Municipal consumer debt has an adverse impact on the financial wellbeing of a 
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municipality. It is defined as the "non-payment of property rates, fees/charges for 
services provided by municipalities (for example water, sanitation, electricity and 
refuse removal) and various other financial obligations to municipalities (which 
include for example, traffic fines and rental housing payments)" (Financial Fiscal 
Commission 2012, 155). As such, the nature of municipal consumer debt includes 
amounts that are practically bad debts or irretrievable, as well as the late payments 
for services and property rates (Financial and Fiscal Commission, 2012).  
The most prominent effects of non-payment of services and taxes in a South 
African context can be summarised in the following cases (Financial and Fiscal 
Commission): 
• The Constitution sets a very clear and comprehensive set of roles and 
responsibilities to which municipalities are obligated to fulfil. Failure to collect 
revenue by way of consumer debt decreases a municipality's ability to fulfil 
its roles and responsibilities. 
• The unconditional LES transfer is not enough for a municipality to meet its 
socio-economic targets.  A rise in municipal consumer debt essentially 
decreases funding available for poverty alleviation and development by way 
of less than optimal levels of basic services delivery and infrastructure 
maintenance and upgrades. 
• Municipal consumer debt also creates a burden on those that do fulfil their 
payment obligations as municipalities become more reliant on them to 
support those that are non-compliant. 
Broadly speaking, municipal debtors can include businesses, households, 
individuals as well as other public sector entities. The literature suggests that there 
are various reasons for the occurrence and/or increase in municipal consumer 
debt, which is why it can be observed across the poorest to the wealthiest 
municipalities. This is discussed further in the literature review. 
2.7 Trends in own revenue generation and consumer debt and the local 
government equitable share 
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Figure 5: Trends in Operating revenue in relation to other revenue sources 
 
Source: Authors own analysis from National Treasury Municipal Finance Database and Division of Revenue Bills 
Between 2006 and 2012, the municipal operating revenue and the local 
government equitable share allocation has increased on average by 11 percent 
and 19 percent per annum respectively. The increase in the local government 
equitable share bodes well for municipalities as it is indicative of an improvement 
in the financial support national government provides to assist municipalities 
supporting poor households and subsidising the provision of basic services (South 
African Local Government Association, 2012). Despite aggregate municipal 
operating revenue increasing over the period, property rates, one of a 
municipality's main income sources, has been decreasing as a share of total 
operating revenue. 
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Figure 6: LES as a percentage of operating revenue 
 
Source: Authors own analysis from National Treasury Municipal Finance Database and Division of Revenue Bills 
The figure above provides an illustration of the percentage share of the Local 
Government Equitable Share Allocation on municipal operating revenue over a 6-
year period. The data suggests that that the LES as a share of operating revenue 
has increased gradually over the period at an average annual rate of about 6 
percent. The increase in the local government equitable share bodes well for 
municipalities as it is indicative of an improvement in the financial support national 
government provides to assist municipalities supporting poor households and 
subsidising the provision of basic services (South African Local Government 
Association, 2012). 
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Figure 7:Compounded growth in revenue source as a share of Operating Revenue (2006 - 2012) 
 
Source: Authors own analysis from National Treasury Municipal Finance Database and Division of Revenue Bills 
The figure above shows that over the period from 2006 to 2012, the LES average 
annual growth was 4 percent, double the annual growth in services charges as a 
share operating revenue. Over the period, property rates as a share of operating 
revenue decreased on average by 2 percent annually. Although property rates and 
service charges still remain a significant share of municipal operating revenue, the 
rise in LES may suggest that more municipalities are seeing the grant as a 
substitute for revenue mobilisation as opposed to as a supplementary grant to 
meet shortfalls in the provision of goods and services. 
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Figure 8: Growth in rates and taxes on all property (3-year Compound Annual Growth Rates), 2000 - 2016 
 
Source: 2016/17 Rates and Taxes Report, SAPOA 
The figure above illustrates the compound 3-year annual growth rate for property 
rates and taxes for all property types (residential, industrial, commercial and retail). 
The spikes and drops in growth suggest a volatility in property rates, not the trend 
one would associate with a period of tax breaks or cuts. The volatile movement 
growth rates in property taxes are more associated with macroeconomic instability 
(South African Property Owners Association, 2017). 
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Figure 9: Trends in consumer debt levels as a percentage of municipal operating revenue 
 
Source: Authors own analysis from National Treasury Municipal Finance Database 
The data suggests that, between the municipal financial periods of 2004/05 to 
2012/13, water was the largest driver of municipal consumer debt with just over 10 
percent share of operating revenue in 2012. From refuse removal debt to property 
rates debt, all subcategories of municipal consumer debt as a share of operating 
revenue have observed increases over the period, this is indicative of poor 
collection practices. Such poor practices could be related to a lack of capacity in 
some municipalities or laziness as result of possibly receiving funding that allows 
them to substitute collection efforts (like an unconditional grant). Although not as 
large a water debt, electricity debt showed the largest annual average increase as 
percentage of operating revenue, with 8 percent. This is followed by sanitation debt 
(7 percent) and water debt (6%). Such a trend will continue to make the debt 
management function difficult to manage, with adverse effects on revenue 
performance and mobilisation. 
2.8 Conclusion 
In summary, the discussion above has provided a clear overview of the evolution 
of the design and function of the LES in the context of the evolving local 
government fiscal environment. It raises the question as to how the various 
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iterations to the grant formula have supported or restricted municipalities in terms 
of service delivery and administrative issues. Understanding the LES in the context 
of local government revenue and expenditure assignments allows for the 
interpretation of decisions made at the local level with respect to revenue 
generation and debt collection practices. In the context of revenue generation and 
debt collection, consumer debt management trends provide another possible 
perspective as to how public officials react in the context of receiving increasing 
LES. The various iterations of the LES have also not recognised, implicitly or 
explicitly the implications of the grant on municipal consumer debt. A lack of 
controls or mechanisms for mitigation against increasing municipal consumer debt 
as a possible behavioural response to increases in the LES presents a challenging 
issue to be analysed further in this minor dissertation. 
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3 Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to present a review of literature from both the empirical and 
theoretical perspectives. The theoretical analysis looks at theory in relation to a 
municipality’s own revenue performance as affected by intergovernmental 
transfers. In addition, theory around consumer debt management and the 
occurrence and/or increase in municipal consumer debt will be explored. In 
addition, this chapter also reviews empirical work to understand how similar studies 
have applied the relevant theory and what the possible implications of those 
studies are on this paper. 
3.2 Theoretical analysis 
3.2.1 Fiscal federalism 
Fiscal federalism refers to the partition of spheres of government and their 
respective roles, functions, and financial relationships between each sphere of 
government. It also addresses issues associated with the impact of 
intergovernmental transfers from national government to local government 
(Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972; Bird, 1998). The fiscal incentives approach was 
developed under the theory of fiscal federalism (Weingast, 2009). The fiscal 
incentives approach refers to the critical role of institutions in revenue generation 
at the municipal level, as well as the interaction with public officials with respect to 
incentivising accountable behaviour (Careaga and Weingast, 2003; Singh and 
Srinivasan, 2006). The theory suggests that the way in which intergovernmental 
transfers are structured has a direct effect on fiscal incentives in a decentralised 
system and the decisions undertaken by the recipient municipality.  
Fiscal federalism theory suggests that grants from national government that are 
weakly positively or negatively related to municipal own revenue create poor and 
adverse fiscal incentives for public officials and hinder economic growth at the local 
level. Fiscal federalism theory also suggests that municipalities that overly rely on 
grants from national government tend to be less accountable to their constituents, 
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tend to be less efficient and effective in administering and collecting taxes and in 
the provisions of public goods (Weingast, 2009; Bird, 2010). 
3.2.2 Flypaper effect 
The phenomenon of intergovernmental transfers increasing local public 
expenditure but not contributing to tax cuts is known as the flypaper effect. The 
flypaper effect in this context indicates that an increase intergovernmental transfers 
to municipalities, encourages increases in municipal spending but not any 
simultaneous increases in municipal own revenue generation (Hines and Thaler, 
1995; Turnbull, 1998; Inman 2008). Municipal expenditure is incentivised while 
municipal tax revenue collection is disincentivised.  
Additionally, intergovernmental transfers could become "gap filling". A gap filling 
transfer is one where the national government's unconditional grant is used to bail 
out a municipality in financial distress (Weingast, 2009). In such an instance, 
municipalities are perversely incentivised to spend more than their revenue.  
Municipalities with significant deficits are likely to receive greater grants from 
national government, relaxing their budget constraints (Brun and El Khdari, 2016). 
3.2.3 Information asymmetry 
Fiscal federalism theory also links the adverse effects of intergovernmental 
transfers to information asymmetry. Intergovernmental grants from national 
government that have an inverse relationship with the municipality's tax base or a 
proxy for tax capacity, create an incentive for the municipality to amend their fiscal 
and tax strategy in a way that allows them to receive a larger grant from national 
government (Bordignon et al, 2001). Information asymmetry between national 
government and municipalities can thus result in municipalities reducing own 
revenue generation. This reduction happens through under-taxing, increasing 
public expenditure, and overspending their budgets with the hopes of receiving 
more support from national government through larger intergovernmental grants 
(Bordignon et al, 2001).  
3.2.4 The virtuous cycle model 
The Virtuous Cycle Model is a theory used to explain the crowding in effect of 
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intergovernmental transfers on municipal own revenue generation. According to 
the theory, intergovernmental transfers can increase public expenditure by 
municipality, which in turn increases the private income levels of a municipality's 
constituency. The incidence of voluntary tax compliance also increases, thus 
leading to higher levels of own revenue generation (Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi, 
2014). Increased public expenditure is achieved as the grant from national 
government reduces the local government revenue constraints, allowing the 
municipality to focus more on providing quality public goods and services, as well 
as improving tax collecting capacity (Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi, 2014). As the tax 
collection competency is improved at the municipal level, tax compliance, 
willingness to pay fines and taxes, as well as vertical accountability all improve 
(Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi, 2014).  
3.2.5 Income effect  
The income effect suggests that grants from national government have the effect 
of weakening a municipality's desire to collect taxes, thus decreasing municipal 
own revenue generation (Bravo, 2013). Given that less tax is collected during the 
income effect, the private consumption of a municipality’s constituents may 
increase.  Any increase in public expenditure at the municipal level will be less than 
the increase of the intergovernmental transfer, due to weak collection efforts 
(Bravo, 2013). 
3.2.6 Crowding out and crowding in effects 
There has also been theory which attempts to explain the crowding out effect of 
intergovernmental transfers on own municipal revenue as a result of municipalities 
substituting municipal transfers for tax revenue (Bradford & Oates, 1971a, 1971b; 
Mogues & Benin, 2011). As intergovernmental grants increase, the fiscal autonomy 
at municipal level decreases because the rising grant can be seen as a growing 
national government involvement, which has the effect of distorting the fiscal 
environment at the local level - contributing to adverse revenue collection decisions 
(Bradford & Oates, 1971a, 1971b; Alani, 2006; Mogues & Benin, 2011).  
The Median Voter Model captures the above phenomenon. In the case of an initial 
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optimal balance, where public and private consumption are interchangeable units, 
intergovernmental transfers from national government have the effect of making 
available resources for municipalities to afford its constituents benefits in the form 
of actively reducing local fees and taxes, consequently  crowding out tax collection 
efforts and own revenue generation (Bradford & Oates, 1971a, 1971b; Mogues & 
Benin, 2011).  
Zhang (2013) adds a further nuance to the theory of municipality's substituting 
intergovernmental transfers for local revenue generation. Such a substitution could 
possibly be partial or full substitution. Where the effect of intergovernmental 
transfer is partial substitution of local revenue generation, this indicative of 
municipalities combining transfers with increasing or consistent level tax collection 
to increase public expenditure, improving service provision and thus increasing 
municipal own revenue (Zhang (2013). Alternatively, where there is a full 
substitution of transfers for local revenue, the transfers are returned to constituents 
through tax breaks.  The transfers do not increase local public spending; it remains 
at the same level as it was prior to receipt of the grant (Deller & Maher, 2005; 
Zhang; 2013). 
 A crowding in effect of intergovernmental transfers on local revenue generation 
could also be explained through the concept of fiscal illusion. Fiscal illusion theory 
suggests that due to information asymmetry, a municipality's constituency is 
unaware of the true value of public goods and services (Turnbull, 1998; Dahlby & 
Frede, 2012; Mahabir, 2014). Under this theory, a municipality's constituency does 
not know the level of intergovernmental transfers and own local revenue used to 
fund and deliver public goods and services. As a result, a fiscal illusion is created 
as constituents may feel that the price of the goods and services are lower than 
what they really are (Turnbull, 1998; Mahabir, 2014). In presence of increased 
demand for goods and services, local own revenue may increase with no tax 
breaks as associated with median voter model. Increases in municipal own 
revenue may be offset by the larger increase in public expenditure and ensuing 
oversupply of public goods and services as a result of a fiscal illusion (Mahabir, 
2014). 
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The crowding in effect is only achieved where a grant from national government to 
local government is not used for tax relief but to improve the provision of public 
goods and services (Brun and El Khdari, 2016). One example is when a 
municipality uses the intergovernmental grant to refurbish retail and commercial 
areas within the municipality's jurisdiction, which enhances market activity levels, 
revenue for businesses and entrepreneurs, and thus contributing to voluntary tax 
compliance (Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi, 2014) 
3.2.7 Municipal consumer debt 
In terms of municipal consumer debt and the theory of non-payment, studies have 
shown a wide range of drivers. South African municipalities operate in an inherited 
context of inequality and socio-economic disadvantages. As such, the inability to 
pay, as a theory of non-payment, is significant (Botes & Pelser, 2001; Booysen, 
2001). Income levels, poverty and unemployment are significant drivers of non-
payment linked to the inability to pay. Although it has been found that there is good 
representation of low-income households that pay their rates and services 
(Booysen, 2001), there is conversely a representation of high-income households 
that do not pay. Inability to pay may also be a function of education and one's ability 
to interpret municipal accounts.  A survey undertaken across all provinces in 32 
locations, found that disadvantaged households were unable to pay services 
(electricity), citing unemployment and little to no income as the reasons (Botes and 
Pelser, 2001).  
The success of governments is largely dependent on whether the constituents 
observe performance improvements in their activities and functions (Glaser and 
Hildreth, 1999). The study identifies a positive correlation between a municipality's 
performance improvements and the willingness to pay higher taxes and more 
consistently. Therefore, the willingness to pay for taxes declines where a 
municipality underperforms on its service delivery and overall activities. Studies 
have observed phenomena where the constituents act rationally and do not forego 
their tax obligations despite the underperformance of local government; ultimately 
the consequences of a rising consumer debt will impact all, not only government.  
Simonsen and Robbins (2003) sought to understand whether the constituents of 
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Waterford made decisions to pay tax (willingness to pay) based on their views of 
the quality of government and the services provided. The authors undertook a 
survey and found that in a Waterford context, where the respondents’ local 
government was losing tax revenue due to deregulation of certain firms, the 
constituents were willing to continue paying taxes despite subpar services. This 
was an appropriate response aimed at lessening the fiscal pressures on that 
government (Simonsen and Robbins, 2003).  
The above suggests that the constituents’ unwillingness to pay may be driven by 
"cultural norms", where despite knowing the long-term effects of contributing to a 
growing municipal consumer debt, constituents act with their best interest at heart, 
without acknowledging that they are part of a larger community. According to Hagg 
(1998), there is concern that the increasing trend in constituents disengaging from 
the community and showing general sense of apathy towards paying for services 
persists regardless of whether or not the municipal delivers services.  for the 
community at large. Such civil apathy contributes to a trend of not paying for 
services that occur whether the municipality is performing well or not and has no 
concern of the fiscal backlash (Craythorne, 2006).  
Civil disengagement and apathy that leads to unwillingness to pay arises when 
constituents lose complete trust in a municipality. In a study by Kromberg (1995) 
people surveyed stopped paying taxes because they perceive that those operating 
their municipality are corrupt and will mismanage their funding. Such claims are 
made where municipalities are known to be recipients of funding from national 
government by their constituents, however benefits are felt to not be passed on 
through quality services and the consistent maintenance of infrastructure 
(Kromberg,1995). 
3.3 Empirical Analysis 
The impact of intergovernmental grants (given to local government) on municipal 
own revenue generation can either be crowding in or crowding out. As stated in 
the sub section above, a crowding out effect of an intergovernmental grant on 
municipal generation suggests that a municipality substitutes municipal revenue 
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with the grant. A crowding in effect suggests that the grant has a positive and 
increasing effect on a municipality’s ability to generate own revenue. 
Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi (2014) investigate the impact of unconditional central 
grants on 77 Benin communes (local government level) from 2003 to 2008. The 
unconditional grant in this study follows a very simple allocation framework that is 
solely based on the population size of the jurisdiction under each commune. The 
simplicity of this allocation framework contrasts the complexity of the multi-faceted 
LES presented in Chapter 2 of this minor dissertation. The authors suggest that 
simple allocation grants are more complimentary to local revenue generation than 
more complicated formula-based grants. Simple allocation grants tend to be 
transparent, less likely to be distorted or manipulated, less directive and increase 
local government autonomy (Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi, 2014).  
The study does not present other examples of countries that also utilise simple 
unconditional grant allocation frameworks that observe an incentive effect that 
improves local revenue generation. The results of their panel analysis found that 
in the context of Benin, unconditional intergovernmental transfers are positively 
correlated with own revenue generation at the local level. The study suggests that 
an incentive effect is observed where municipal public officials use the 
unconditional grant to spend on public goods and services of relevance and need 
to their constituency, thus increasing their marginal utility and increasing their 
willingness to pay fees and taxes, indicative of the virtuous circle model (Caldeira 
and Rota-Graziosi, 2014).  
Sanogo and Brun (2016) explore the impact of grants on revenue mobilisation in 
35 local departments in Ivory Coast over a 10-year period from 2001 to 2011. This 
study disaggregates local own revenue into tax revenue (residential, retail, and 
commercial property tax) and non-tax revenue (fees and charges). It makes the 
assumption that conflict and political instability may affect a non-tax and tax base 
differently, thus making tax collection more stable than non-tax collection. From a 
South African perspective, while conflict (war) and political instability do not affect 
the status quo, as described in the theoretical overview, willingness to pay and the 
inability to pay may affect the tax base and non-tax base differently. This nuance 
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is not considered; the study makes use of a fixed effects method that assumes that 
the unobserved heterogeneity among each unique local department can be varying 
or constant over time (Sanogo & Brun, 2016). Their results show that an increase 
in intergovernmental grants increases both tax revenue and non-tax revenue by 
4.1 and 1.8 percent respectively. Although the grant is said to have a positive 
impact on revenue mobilisation, it reduces administration costs and it improves 
regional disparities in terms of local revenue collection, the magnitude between the 
two categories of revenue are different, suggesting that the grant improves on 
average the ability to collect property taxes more than service charges.  
Masaki (2018) tries to show that in countries where municipalities’ capacity to 
undertake tax collection is poor, or the political costs of enforcing tax is low, there 
is a tendency to crowd in own local revenue through intergovernmental grants. This 
is contrary to other studies. The author uses district level data for local revenues 
in Tanzania, for financial years between 2010 and 2013. The author first uses OLS 
estimates to determine the effects of per capita grants on local revenue, however, 
he suggests results may be biased due to endogeneity (Masaki, 2018). In this 
study, precipitation is used as an instrument for the grant transfer, and the rationale 
behind this is that rainfall has an impact on own revenue generation of districts 
because affects agricultural outputs. The Tanzanian Government also uses 
precipitation in the formula to determine grant allocations (Masaki, 2018).  
In addition to rainfall, the author also includes distance from the capital, Dar es 
Salaam, as an instrument for central government grants.  The author is of the view 
that it is an exogenous variable that impacts on the amounts received by each 
district; districts that are closer to the capital tend to have more bargaining power 
(Masaki, 2018). The author’s results indicate a strong crowding in effect as the 
impact of intergovernmental transfers are positively correlated and statistically 
significant to municipal own revenue. What this means is that there is an incentive 
effect at play as municipalities do not use the intergovernmental grant for tax 
breaks or forgoing tax collection, the grant is used for increasing public expenditure 
by improving local administration and tax enforcement, which in turn increases 
municipal revenue (Masaki, 2018). In addition, the author finds that rural 
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municipalities experience the positive correlation of grants to local revenue at a 
higher magnitude than urban municipalities (Masaki, 2018). This is possibly 
because rural municipalities tend to significantly rely on intergovernmental grants 
to provide public goods and services to their constituents, increasing their marginal 
utility and the associated marginal positive effects of intergovernmental grants on 
the provision of public goods and services (Masaki, 2018). It is not clear how rural 
municipalities are defined in this study and what factors differentiate them from 
urban municipalities in that context. 
In Zhang’s (2013) study of local government fiscal behaviours as a result of 
intergovernmental grants in China, the author looks at the impact of three fiscal 
transfers: tax returns, revenue sharing and clustered as unconditional; special 
purpose transfer (SPT), conditional grant; and fiscal capacity transfers (FCT), 
unconditional grants from the national government. The author suggests that the 
impact of an intergovernmental grant should also be understood in the context of 
the characteristics of each type of grant provided, the intended policy roles that 
national government assigned to said grants (Zhang, 2013). The effect of each 
type of transfer on local revenue differed. Tax returns, a revenue sharing grant, 
had a positive correlation to local revenue sharing, suggesting a stimulation effect 
of the grant own revenue. This is due to the policy role and allocation method of 
this grant - the more taxes are collected, the higher share of tax returns. The FCT 
grant, as the pure unconditional transfer, showed a partial substitution effect 
because local government spent less than one yuan received through the grant, 
with the difference reallocated to the constituents through a combination of tax 
returns and tax reductions. SPT grants (conditional transfer) had an incentive or 
stimulating effect local revenue generation as one yuan of grant received increased 
local spending by more than one yuan. As a conditional specific purpose grant, it 
has the impact of lowering the relative prices of specified goods and services, 
creating a fiscal illusion where the demand of these goods and services increases, 
thus crowding in local revenue. The author uses a county dataset for the 2005 
financial year. A clear limitation of this study is that it is a cross sectional study, 
therefore one cannot ascertain a trend and confidently predict whether such 
incentive effects would prevail over multiple years. 
 
 
  Page 38 of 113 
Where the study above used a cross sectional dataset, the authors in the study to 
follow sought to understand the incentive effects of conditional and unconditional 
intergovernmental transfers on Moroccan municipalities’ ability to generate their 
own revenue in panel data analysis (Brun and El Khdari, 2016). The study uses 
Moroccan municipalities’ public finance data over the period of 2005-2009 (5 
years). Using a sample of municipalities that use both the conditional and 
unconditional grant, Brun and El Khdari (2016) estimated their panel data using 
random effects, fixed effects and the Hausmann-Taylor estimates. The results of 
this study show that both conditional and unconditional grants have an incentive 
effect - they crowd in municipal own revenue (Brun and El Khdari, 2016). The 
reason behind this effect is that unconditional grants in Morocco contain a 
component based on tax collection efforts and revenue mobilisation, therefore the 
more revenue a municipality can generate, the greater share of the unconditional 
grant it receives. Conditional grants had a smaller, stimulating impact on local 
revenue because of the associated limited scope of public expenditure choices and 
reality that specific public investments may not be accepted or well received by a 
municipality’s constituents (Brun and El Khdari, 2016).  
The crowding out effect of intergovernmental transfers on local own revenue 
generation can be observed in a number of studies. Bravo (2013) explores the 
effects of an unconditional transfer on municipalities in Chile. The author runs a 
panel data model on a sample that included 340 municipalities over the period 
1990 to 2007. The author identified the challenge of endogeneity that characterised 
government transfers in his study, given that municipal revenue is in part 
determined by a municipality’s characteristic that also related how much a 
municipality receives from a grant. Endogeneity is an important issue to consider 
when dealing with grants to local government. The author found statistical 
endogeneity and theoretical endogeneity (grant design) in this study. This is not to 
say that endogeneity occurs in all intergovernmental grant cases. One would need 
to review the components of the grant with respect to own local revenue, as well 
as performing the relevant statistical tests to confirm because grant designs are 
generally unique to each country. This is particularly evident in the various 
instrumentals used in the different studies where endogeneity was found or 
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theoretically assumed (no evidence of diagnostic tests undertaken to confirm).  
Masaki (2018) uses rainfall and the distance of a municipality to the capital city 
(Dar es Salaam) as instrumental variables while Brun and El Khdari (2016) use 
political indicators such as the number of elected officials in a municipality. To 
address the endogeneity issue in the Bravo (2013) study, the author uses an 
instrumental variable estimator to identify an exogenous variation in the Municipal 
Common Fund (FCM), the unconditional grant in this context. The ingresos propios 
permantes per capita (IPPP) is the component of the FCM that measures the own 
revenue of a municipality which is the equalisation component of the grant If it is 
higher than the national average, it is negative and vice versa. The IPPP amount 
matches the sum of the previous two-year revenue from the following sources:  
business tax; fines; property tax; municipal rights; vehicle tax and other fees 
(Bravo, 2013).  
The study makes use of a fixed effects method of panel analysis because one of 
its abilities is to control for changes in protocol and regulation that affect all 
municipalities. This is particularly in important in a South African context when one 
considers changes regulatory landscape of local government. He finds that an 
increase per capita of unconditional grant to municipalities decreases municipal 
per capita own revenue by between 0.25 and 0.30 standard deviations. This is 
indicative of a crowding out effect of unconditional grants on local revenue (Bravo, 
2013). The crowding out observation in this study is a result of the income effect. 
When municipalities are responsible for tax collection, like the case in this study, 
the levels of revenue collects are directly linked to their collection efforts. Such 
revenue collection efforts are costly to undertake.  When municipalities receive 
more unconditional grants, they collect less tax revenue, not as a result of tax cuts, 
but poor effort in lieu of an income effect (Bravo, 2016). 
In another African study, Mogues & Benin (2011) sought to observe whether 
intergovernmental transfers to local government in Ghana had a crowding out 
effect on a municipality’s own revenue generating ability, in other words, does local 
government undertake less revenue generating efforts because of 
intergovernmental transfers. This study suggests that, from a policy perspective, it 
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is important to conduct research on the impact of intergovernmental transfers on 
municipality revenue generating decisions and their potential crowding out effects 
in order to better structure these transfers and minimise their negative impacts 
(Mogues & Benin, 2011). The authors use a long panel data set that covers a 
period of eleven years, the cross section in this regard are Ghana’s districts, all 
110 of them are used in their study.   
Using levels of per capita own revenue as the dependent variable to the model, 
(Mogues & Benin, 2011) also ran variations on the specification and measurement 
of the model using the Hausmann-Taylor estimation to overcome issues and 
limitations associated with random effects and fixed effects estimations. The main 
result of this study was that intergovernmental grants did not lead to greater own 
revenue generation.  They had the effect of discouraging own revenue generation. 
This crowding out effect is a result of the median voter model coming into play. In 
this instance, municipalities in Ghana receive intergovernmental transfers from 
central government and through the substitution of the grant with own revenue 
generated, increase private consumption through a decrease revenue collection 
(Mogues & Benin, 2011). The decrease in revenue collection could reflect laziness 
on the part of capacitated municipalities or inefficiencies the grant maybe 
insufficient for dealing with under-capacitated municipalities. This has the impact 
of decreasing public expenditure and local revenue generation. When looking at 
the allocation framework of the intergovernmental grant observed in this study, 
another possible contributing factor to the crowding out of local revenue is that the 
grant does not include a component associated with tax collection or municipal 
revenue mobilisation, therefore not creating sufficient incentive or motivation to use 
the grant to increase public spending (to improve revenue collection) and generate 
revenue. 
Similar studies on the crowding out effect of intergovernmental transfers have been 
taken around the world. Zhuravskaya (2000) undertook a study for Russia, where 
the author finds that crowding out effects of own revenue generating activities by 
transfers to local government are observed. The author uses a panel data set 
containing budgetary data of local government for six years. 
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Some articles suggest that grants from national government to municipalities have 
the effect of a revenue reduction due to a lack of effort on the part of municipalities 
in collecting money owed for services rendered creating municipal consumer debt 
(Mogues & Benin, 2011). Other literature certainly expands on this notion of an 
inefficient local government in light of a grant from national government, with some 
articles indicating that despite the good intentions that a grant possesses, it is more 
likely to increase or create issues with tax effort and tax administration on 
municipalities (Tanzi, 1996; Cullis & Lewis, 1997; Zhuravskaya, 2000; Dahlby, 
2002; Cardenas & Sharma, 2011) 
3.3.1 Conclusion 
Previous studies across the world have shown that transfers from central 
government can either crowd in or crowd out local revenue, and in some cases, 
have no effect on local revenue (Dahlberg, 2008). The most common explanations 
used in the literature for the lack of consensus amongst studies are the varying 
allocation frameworks and formulae used to determine intergovernmental 
transfers, country specific contexts, levels of autonomy  around setting tax and fee 
charge base, scope of municipal revenue assignment, and the kind mechanisms 
in grants that intentionally encourage revenue mobilisation (Masaki, 2018; Bravo, 
2013; Caldeira & Rota Graziosia, 2014; Dahlberg, 2008; Brun & El Khdari, 2016; 
Mogues & Benin, 2011; Zhuravskaya, 2000; Buettner, 2006 Cardenas & Sharma, 
2009; Sanogo & Brun, 2016; Wildasin, 2009).  
Studies have mainly focused on the impact of intergovernmental transfers on local 
revenue generation. While more recent studies have differentiated on the grant 
side, looking at the impact of unconditional and conditional grants on local revenue, 
other studies have disaggregated local revenue into tax revenue and non-tax 
revenue (Brun & El Khdari, 2016; Zhang, 2013).  
This minor dissertation introduces another aspect that can be used to asses 
municipal performance in lieu of receiving intergovernmental grants, through 
analysis of the impact of intergovernmental grants on municipal consumer debt. It 
is apparent that the literature on fiscal dependency at the local government level 
has to date omitted municipal consumer debt as a measure of revenue 
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performance. Previous studies have rather focused on the impact of grants on 
expenditure and revenues collected.  
This minor dissertation contributes to the African and South African literature on 
fiscal dependency, both from a theoretical and methodological perspective. In an 
African context, Mogues & Benin (2011) undertook this exercise by testing 
intergovernmental grants on own revenue generation to test the behavioural 
effects on municipalities in Ghana. This minor dissertation extends this work by 
observing the effects of grant financing on municipal debt. From a methodological 
standpoint, previous work on the impact of the local equitable share on municipal 
expenditure (Amusa et al, 2008) and municipal revenue (Mahabir, 2012) in South 
Africa, have both used cross sectional data sets. This minor dissertation improves 
on this work by using a panel data set. 
Including the analysis on municipal consumer debt as a performance indicator for 
revenue collection, in addition to other generally used local government fiscal 
indicators promises a unique perspective on the behavioural responses of local 
government to an increase in grant funding. Additionally, the impact of grant 
financing on municipal own revenue efforts and consumer debt has theoretical 
implications for the literature, as well as important policy implications on how 
national government design grants and finance local government. This is 
especially important in the South African context, where debt owed to 
municipalities is in excess of R140 billion (National Treasury, 2018). 
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4 Chapter 4: Methodology and Data 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes in detail the empirical models used to test the impact of the 
LES on municipal own revenue and municipal consumer debt. In addition, the 
chapter provides description of variables used as well as their sources and the 
estimation techniques used. 
4.2 Overview of the methodology 
The primary research objective of this minor dissertation is to assess the impact, if 
any, that the LES has on a municipality’s ability to generate its own revenue. The 
sub-objective that serves to complement the primary research objective and 
improve the robustness of the analysis through a revenue performance indicator 
follows an assessment of the impact of the LES on municipal consumer debt. In 
order to meet the primary research objective, two functions will be specified.  
The analysis of the first model will be based on empirical models that estimate the 
municipal revenue generation function using panel data estimation techniques 
(Mogues & Benin, 2011; Brun & El Khdari, 2016; Sanogo & Brun, 2016). Based on 
these models, a panel data regression using municipality operating revenue as a 
dependent variable and local equitable share (unconditional government transfer) 
as the independent variable of interest, along with socio-economic and revenue 
generating control variables. 
The second model specified enables robust interpretation of the first model by 
offering a revenue performance indicator in the form of an analysis on municipal 
consumer debt. This model has a similar design to the municipal operating revenue 
function. The main differences are municipal consumer debt is the dependent 
variable, and the explanatory variable consists of socio-economic variables which 
literature suggests may influence a debtor’s inability to pay (Botes & Pelser, 2001; 
Booysen, 2001; Financial and Fiscal Commission, 2012). 
Panel data is used in this study to answer both research questions; hence panel 
methods will be used. Both the fixed effects, as well as random effects model will 
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be used. In this study, Hausman specification test is run to see which panel data 
analysis model is most effective. Given the time-invariant effects associated with 
municipalities, the fixed effects model is used theoretically. Another reason that 
fixed effects model is favoured in studies of this nature is that it is effective in 
dealing with unobserved heterogeneity across units (Plumper & Troeger, 2007). 
Using these different panel data analytic models, it is expected that insight into how 
the respective underlying assumptions of the different methods affect the key 
results will be gained (Mogues & Benin, 2011).  
The panel data analysis will allow the author to study the aggregate behaviour of 
municipalities over time with respect to their interaction with local equitable share 
allocation.  Empirically, it represents the most effective way to attempt to answer 
this minor dissertation’s research questions. 
4.3 Model specification 
The choice of control variables used in specifying model 1 and 2 are a combination 
of the following factors: current literature and similar studies, economic theory and 
intuition, and the availability of up-to-date verifiable data on South African 
municipalities. The latter has the most significant impact on the choice of variables 
used. This is the main reason why there is significant variation in terms of the 
control variables used in similar studies. Explanatory variables can be broadly 
grouped under socio-economic indicators, sectoral indicators, administrative and 
political indicators affecting a municipality's ability to generate its own revenue 
(Sanogo & Brun, 2016; Brun & El Khdari, 2016; Masaki, 2018). 
4.3.1 Model 1 
𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑙𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑟𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑤𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑡 + έ𝑖𝑡………….(1) 
Where the subscripts i represents 127 South African local and metropolitan 
municipalities, i.e. i = 1,2...,127. The subscript t represents the time periods, i.e. t 
= 1, 2, 3, ...T. 
In model 1 above, the dependent and independent variables are municipal own 
revenue (the aggregate of local tax and non-tax revenue) and the LES (the 
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unconditional transfer) respectively.  
Working age population variable (𝑤𝑟𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) 
The working population variable represents the working age population of the 
municipality, therefore age group between 15 and 64 years old. Assuming that 
there is sufficient economic activity to pursue, the inclusion of the working 
population is important as it shows a municipality's potential revenue base 
(Mogues & Benin, 2011). It is expected that municipal own revenue is positively 
correlated with the size of the working population. 
Disposable income variable (𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡) 
The disposable income of a municipality's constituency is another factor that 
determines the revenue base of a municipality as it captures spending power of 
the constituency. Individuals with higher amount of disposable income are able to 
pay and thus demand more public goods and services. In the absence income 
variables, Brun and El Khdari (2016) used poverty rates at the local level as a proxy 
for income levels. Theory suggests that there should be a positive correlation 
between income levels of a constituency and municipal own revenue. 
Formal households’  variable (ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑡)  
Similar studies have used a measure of urbanisation in a municipality within their 
models to capture economic development and the revenue base (Zhang, 2013). 
The number of formal households is used as a proxy for urbanisation. Owning a 
formal household not only means one is subject to property tax, but formal 
households are connected to electricity grids and most likely use and pay charges 
for the provision of basic services. As a proxy of urbanisation, the number of formal 
households is expected to be positively correlated to municipal own revenue. 
The pension aged variable (𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) 
This variable captures the size of the retirement age group, those in population 65 
years and older. This variable has the opposite effect of working population on 
municipal own revenue. Having a growing pensioned aged population in this 
context has adverse effects on the local economic conditions in a municipality 
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(Caldeira & Rota-graziosi, 2014). This is because the pension age population no 
longer contribute to the tax and service charges base. In fact, they place a burden 
on the state through social protection schemes and property tax rebates. Theory 
suggests a negative correlation between the number of pensioners and municipal 
own revenue. 
The Gross Value Add variable (𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡) 
GVA measures the total value of goods and services produced in a municipality. 
This variable serves as a good proxy for economic and business activity. Data 
limitations have hampered other studies’ attempts to measure sectoral and 
economic activity at the local level. In Brun and El Khdari (2016), the proportion of 
the municipal population working in the agriculture sector is used as proxy for 
economic activity. Significant business activity suggests that municipalities may be 
able to collect more property taxes associated with growing industrial, retail and 
commercial developments. Businesses typically consume more water and 
electricity than individuals, therefore municipalities could earn greater service 
charges. The theory suggests that GVA is positively correlated to municipal own 
revenue. 
Number of people employed (𝑤𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡) 
Employment and unemployment levels within a municipality's constituency are 
potential determinants of local revenue (Mogues & Benin, 2011). It is suggested 
that income base will be higher where more employment levels are higher (Brun & 
El Khdari, 2016). The employed have a direct and indirect impact on a 
municipality's own revenue. Employed people are more likely to access and pay 
for municipal services and goods than the destitute and unemployed. Through their 
labour efforts and productivity levels, employed people contribute to the economic 
output of businesses, which then pay property rates and service charges. As more 
people are employed, assuming a certain level of productivity, businesses and 
industries grow and the subsequent revenue collected grows. Theory suggests a 
positive correlation between the number of employed people and municipal own 
revenue. 
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4.3.2 Model 2 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑙𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑙𝑖𝑡 +𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 + έ𝑖𝑡 
 ………...(2) 
Where the subscripts i represents 127 South African local and metropolitan 
municipalities, i.e. i = 1,2...,127. The subscript t represents the time periods, i.e. t 
= 1, 2 ,3 ...T. 
In model 2 above, the dependent and independent variables are municipal 
consumer debt (𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡) and the local equitable share grant (𝑙𝑛𝑙𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡) 
respectively. Model 2 should be understood and interpreted with respect to Model 
1 above.  For example, assuming statistical significance of variables, if a negative 
correlation is observed between municipal own revenue and the LES in model 1, 
and a positive correlation is observed between municipal consumer debt and the 
LES, this could suggest that municipalities are substituting the grant for own 
revenue generation. Given the declining revenue performance and rising debt in 
this scenario, municipalities are easing on their tax collection efforts. 
The good audit variable (𝑔𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡) 
This variable serves as a proxy for fiscal capacity. According to Bravo (2013), a 
lack of capacity or tax collection systems severely hampers a municipality's ability 
for revenue mobilisation. An unqualified opinion (dummy variable denoted by 1 in 
the dataset) suggests that the Auditor General found good financial practice within 
that municipality, which could suggest that there are at least effective debt 
management systems in place. The good audit variable is expected to be 
negatively correlated to municipal consumer debt. 
Number of unemployed variable (𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡) 
According to consumer debt theory inability to pay is a function of prevailing socio-
economic issues, including unemployment and poverty (Financial and Fiscal 
Commission, 2012).  Including the number of unemployed people is an important 
indicator of inability to pay because as the unemployed level increases, more 
people cannot pay for basic services and tax, thus increasing debt. Theory 
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suggests a positive correlation between municipal consumer debt and the number 
of unemployed (Botes & Pelser, 2001; Booysen, 2001). 
The number of people with no schooling variable (𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑙𝑖𝑡)   
This variable indicates the proportion of a municipality's population that have never 
been to school. The literature suggests that education is another avenue to which 
the inability to pay by a debtor may manifest. According to Booysen (2001) inability 
to pay may also be function of education and one's ability to interpret municipal 
accounts and make effective payments, thereby increasing debt. The no schooling 
variable functions as a proxy for illiteracy. Theory suggests that no schooling 
variable should be positively correlated to municipal consumer debt. 
The personal income variable (𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡) 
This variable captures the aggregate earning level of a municipality's constituency.  
According to theory on inability to pay, poverty is understood as a factor for not 
paying rates (Booysen, 2001). This alludes to a negative correlation between 
municipal consumer debt. When one considers theory of willingness to pay, it 
suggests that municipal consumer debt could rise despite increases in personal 
income as constituents are unsatisfied with the services they receive or divert 
additional personal income from paying for rates to financing alternative energy 
sources while staying on the grid (Kromberg, 1995; Glaser & Hildreth, 1999 
Robbins 2003). Therefore, there could be a positive or negative correlation 
between personal income and municipal consumer debt depending on whether 
willingness to pay or inability to pay is more prevalent.  
Municipalities vary greatly in terms constituent size and their physical boundaries, 
therefore per capita measures will be applied to variables where applicable (not 
applicable for Gini coefficient measure, municipal financial audit finding and the 
number of formal households). In order to be able to interpret regression results as 
percentages and ratio, as well as to standardise unit measure of variables, each 
variable will be transformed into logarithms. 
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4.4 Data 
The analysis uses a panel dataset consisting of 127 South African municipalities 
for the municipal financial period of 2004/05 to 2015/16. The selection of 127 
municipalities out of 257 was made on the basis of only using municipalities that 
provided all four of the basic services: water, electricity, refuse and sewage. This 
is based on the assumption that the municipalities which provide all these basic 
services already face limitations to the total value services charges they receive. 
In addition to the above, it intuitively assumed that municipalities that do not 
provide all four basic services are not subject to the full municipal consumer debt 
risk associated with the provision of all basic services.  
The data were sourced from a combination of Quantec regional economic 
database and IHS Global Insight database; National Treasury’s local government 
database used to develop National Treasury's Budget and Expenditure Reviews. 
The table to follow provides a breakdown of each variable and its source. With 
respect to the independent variable, data on each municipality’s LES allocation 
was obtained from the appendices of each financial periods’ Annual Division of 
Revenue Act. The non-financial data elements that include municipal audit 
opinions in the second specified model were obtained from the Auditor General. 
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Table 2 below offers a comprehensive list of all variables used and their respective 
data sources: 
Table 2: All variables used and their source 
Variable 
name 
Description Source 
Genrev Municipal operating revenue National Treasury Local Government 
Financial database 
Lsgrnt Local equitable share grant Annexures to Annual Division of 
Revenue Act 
Wrkpop Population of municipality above 15 IHS Global Insight database and 
Quantec Regional Economics Database 
Dsinc Household disposable income IHS Global Insight database and 
Quantec Regional Economics Database 
Penpo Population of municipality at pension 
age (=>65) 
IHS Global Insight database and 
Quantec Regional Economics Database 
Gini Municipal level gini coefficient IHS Global Insight database and 
Quantec Regional Economics Database 
Gva Municipal level gross value add  IHS Global Insight database and 
Quantec Regional Economics Database 
Wrker Number of employed people IHS Global Insight database and 
Quantec Regional Economics Database 
Househ Number of formal households IHS Global Insight database and 
Quantec Regional Economics Database 
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Variable 
name 
Description Source 
Debt Municipal consumer debt National Treasury Local Government 
Financial database 
Gaud Municipal level audit opinion Auditor general reports 
Unem Number of unemployed people IHS Global Insight database and 
Quantec Regional Economics Database 
Noschl Number of people with no schooling IHS Global Insight database and 
Quantec Regional Economics Database 
Inc Personal income of population IHS Global Insight database and 
Quantec Regional Economics Database 
4.5 Estimation techniques 
Model 1 and 2 specified above will be estimated slightly differently. In line with 
empirical work that undertakes similar studies, Model 1 will be estimated using 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS); fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE) as 
well as two stage least squares (2SLS). Model 2 will be estimated using the 
standard pooled OLS as well as the two panel data techniques in fixed effects and 
random effects. In the case of this study, the fixed effects panel estimation model 
is used under the assumption that the unobserved intra-municipal heterogeneity is 
correlated with the explanatory variables used in both models. Under this 
assumption, the fixed effects method produces estimates that are both efficient 
and consistent. The above can be rewritten as Corr [(u_i, Xb) ≠ 0].  
In random effects panel data estimation technique is based on the assumption that 
the explanatory variables and unobserved heterogeneity are not correlated in the 
models. Under this assumption, the random effects method produces estimates 
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that are efficient and consistent. This can be written as: Corr [(u_i, Xb) = 0]. In 
model 2, the choice between fixed effects and random effects, that is to determine 
the method that produces efficient and consistent estimates, will be made using 
the Hausman specification test.  
The null hypothesis of the Hausman Test suggests that estimates of the random 
effects and fixed effects model do not have any differences. If the null hypothesis 
is rejected and it is concluded that there are differences in estimates of random 
effects and fixed effects, the fixed effects model is chosen. According to Bell and 
Jones (2013), most studies within the applied economic and political studies field, 
tend to favour the use of the fixed effects model because of the practical difficulties 
in meeting conditions for random effects model, i.e. individual specific effects and 
explanatory variables should not be correlated. 
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5 Chapter 5: Estimation, Results and Interpretation 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the estimation techniques conducted on the 
models specified in Chapter 4. The chapter offers high level statistics of the entire 
database, as well as a detailed presentation of all of the diagnostic tests 
undertaken on the specified models. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
name 
Description Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
genrev Municipal 
operating 
revenue 
1,508 425,000,000 2,430,000,000 4,356,000 35,300,000,000 
Lsgrnt Local 
equitable 
share grant 
1,519 116,000,000 265,000,000 2,207,395 2,850,000,000 
wrkpop Population 
above 15 
1,016 188,290 442,603  4,898 2,837,803 
Dsinc Household 
disposable 
income 
1,143  9,316  28,737 73  309,309 
penpo Population 
at pension 
age (=>65) 
1,143 13,407 30,906 457 222,986 
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Variable 
name 
Description Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Gini Municipal 
level gini 
coefficient 
1,143 0.992126 0.0884243 0 1 
Gva Municipal 
level gross 
value add  
1016 12,100,000 38,000,000 116167 313,000,000 
Wrker Number of 
employed 
people 
889 81,973 239,814  1,607 2,051,033 
househ No of formal 
households 
1,143  57,379  136,135 1,357 1,149,102 
Debt Municipal 
consumer 
debt 
1,522  604,969,000  251,062,100   0 34,800,000,000 
Unem No. of 
unemployed 
people 
1,143 25,099  66,922  272 524,212 
noschl No. of 
people with 
no 
schooling 
1,016 13,072 21,696 159 169,316 
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Variable 
name 
Description Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Inc Personal 
income of 
population 
1,016 9,841  29,946 81 249,907 
Source: Authors own analysis using Stata 13 
The table above provides summary descriptive statistics for the numerical 
variables used in this study over the financial periods of 2004/05 to 2015/16. A look 
at the descriptive statistics in terms of the maximum and minimum values, as well 
as the standard deviation suggests that despite this dataset only including those 
municipalities that provide the four basic services, there are some large disparities 
between municipalities. 
5.3 Diagnostic Tests undertaken  
Before presenting the results of this study, it is important to note that each 
econometric model produced underwent all necessary tests to ensure robustness 
of estimates. This stage is important to ensure validity of results that then lead to 
reliable findings. Failure to conduct tests of robustness will produce results that 
may be unreliable, inconsistent, inefficient and biased. The various tests for 
robustness that were undertaken for both models will be summarised under the 
sub-headings below. 
  
 
 
  Page 57 of 113 
5.3.1 Testing for heteroskedasticity 
If there are differences in the variance of the errors across observations, 
heteroskedasticity is present. According to Wooldridge (2002) this will lead to 
standard errors that are biased and any conclusion on t-and f-statistics and the 
significance of the coefficients would not be correct. Both the fixed effects and 
random effects estimation techniques for panel are highly susceptible to 
heteroskedasticity (Batalgi, 2008). To test for heteroskedasticity in the models, the 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity was undertaken. The 
null hypothesis of this test is homoskedasticity. 
To remedy potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in both models, the 
Stata command option "robust" and "cluster" are used to ensure that standard error 
estimates are robust to disturbances being heteroscedastic and autocorrelated 
(Hoechle, 2007). The results of this test are captured in Section 8.1 of this minor 
dissertation. 
5.3.2 Testing for serial autocorrelation 
Serial correlation leads to smaller standard errors of their respective coefficients 
and higher than normal coefficient of determination (Drukker, 2003). It is suggested 
that serial correlation is not really a problem with shorter panel data sets with 
shorter time periods. It is often associated with panel data with long time series -
more than twenty years. On Stata, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel 
data is used. The null hypothesis of this test suggests that there is no first order 
correlation, with alternative hypothesis suggesting the opposite. The results of this 
test are captured in Section 8.2 of this minor dissertation. 
5.3.3 Testing for random effects 
To make the choice between the use of pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
random effects estimation, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (BPLM) test for 
random effects was used. With respect to this study, the null hypothesis for the 
BPLM test is that variances across municipalities is zero, which essentially means 
that there are no observed panel effects across municipalities over the period. 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis suggests that it would be sufficient to run an 
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OLS regression as there is difference between municipal units. In model 1 and 
model 2, the test produced a predicted value of 0.00 which is less than the alpha 
of 0.05. We therefore rejected the null hypothesis and concluded that random 
effect is an appropriate estimate as there is evidence of significant differences 
across municipalities. The results of this test are captured in sections 8.3 and 8.4 
of this minor dissertation. 
5.3.4 Hausman test 
The Hausman test allows one to choose the most efficient panel data technique in 
fixed effects and random effects estimations. According to Greene (2008), the null 
hypothesis for the Hausman test is that the difference in coefficients is not 
systematic, which suggests the use of the random effects estimator. Rejecting the 
null hypothesis suggests the use of the fixed effects estimator. In summary, the 
Hausman test evaluates whether the unique errors are correlated with the 
regressors (Greene, 2008).  
In model 1, the predicted value of the Hausman test was 0.0064, which is less than 
an alpha of 0.05. We thus reject that null hypothesis and conclude that the unique 
errors are correlated with regressors. The above indicates that the appropriate 
panel estimation technique for model 1 is fixed effects. 
In terms of model 2, the predicted value of the Hausman test was higher than for 
model 1 at 0.0147, but still lower than an alpha of 0.05. Given the above significant 
test statistic, we reject the null hypothesis as there is evidence of systematic 
difference in coefficients, therefore the most appropriate method for model 2 is 
fixed effects. 
With regards to the results above and municipal data in general, theoretically one 
could postulate that there are observable fixed effects across a time period. A fixed 
effect is an effect of the cross section (municipality), this effect cannot be measured 
as it is also not captured in the error term. In theory, the uncaptured fixed effects 
are specific to each municipality and do not change over time, such as the 
municipality's size which is essentially time invariant. This creates an issue as the 
fixed effects are constant over time and therefore effect the overall model. The 
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results of this test are captured in Sections 8.5 and 8.6 of this minor dissertation. 
5.3.5 Testing for endogeneity 
Under the model specification section of this study, it was specified that two panel 
data models will be run to first test the impact of the LES grant on own revenue 
generation (model 1) and the impact of the LES grant on municipal consumer debt 
(model 2). For model 2, the choice will be between fixed effects and random effects 
estimates. Given that model 1 looks at LES grant on municipal revenue over time, 
previous studies in this field have suggested an inherent case of endogeneity 
between municipal revenue and government transfers. The LES is South Africa’s 
version of an unconditional transfer to local government. Considering that both 
random effects and fixed effects estimation techniques carry the assumption that 
all variables are exogenous, it is important to test for endogeneity as it would render 
fixed effects and random effects estimation techniques inappropriate for model 1 
(Knight, 2002).  
According to Gujarati (1995), endogeneity can be caused by various reasons, such 
as the presence of measurement errors, an omitted variable bias, misspecification 
errors, and reverse causality resulting in simultaneous variable bias. Such events 
lead to estimates that are biased. With respect to previous studies, the suggested 
cause of endogeneity is reverse causality as it is suggested that municipal revenue 
is determined by unobservable characteristics related to intergovernmental 
transfers (Bravo, 2013; Masaki, 2018; Brun & Khdari, 2016; Sanogo Brun, 2016; 
Caldeira & Rota-Graziosi, 2014).  
It is also important to note that these studies refer to each country’s own version 
of unconditional and conditional intergovernmental grants. What this means is that 
methodology and formula of these intergovernmental grants differ from country to 
country, meaning that the LES is unique to South Africa. It is possible that 
endogeneity may not be statistical by merely theoretical, as a lot of the previous 
studies do not seem to have actually undertaken statistical endogeneity tests. The 
allocation framework and formula design of the LES, presented in Chapter 2 of this 
minor dissertation, does not suggest any theoretical endogeneity between the LES 
municipal revenue. To ensure that the model is absolutely free from endogeneity, 
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proving the absence of theoretical endogeneity is not enough, one must also test 
for statistical endogeneity. To test for statistical endogeneity, the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test (augment regression test) for endogeneity is applied to the chosen 
fixed effects or random effects estimate in model 1. According to Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993:633), "the augment regression test is formed by using the 
residuals of each endogenous variable as a function of all exogenous variables, in 
a regression of the original model". The null hypothesis of this test suggests that 
residual variable is exogenous. Alternative hypothesis suggests that there is 
endogeneity and an instrumental variable should be created, and an alternative 
means of estimation that isolates the endogenous variable should be undertaken, 
such as the Two Stage Least Squares.  
Using Stata/SE 13, the augmented regression test was performed in four steps: 
1. A regression model was run where the reduced form equation was 
developed. This then regressed the expected endogenous variable (log of 
local equitable share per capita) as a dependent variable on other control 
variables. 
2. The residuals from the above regression model were saved using Stata's 
predict command under the name 'lges_res' 
3. The residual 'lges_res' were then added to the original equation as one of 
the control variables to then compute the augmented regression test. 
4. Through the command 'test lges_res', the significance of the 'lges_res' 
residual variable was computed by way of an f-test. 
As stated above, the null hypothesis for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman augmented 
regression test for endogeneity suggests that the natural log of local equitable 
share per capita is exogenous. The result of the test produced a predicted value 
of 0.2370 which is bigger than alpha of 0.05. Due to the insignificance of the test, 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis and can conclude that the natural log of the 
local government equitable share per capita is not statistically endogenous.  
Given the above endogeneity tests, either fixed effects or random effects model 
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(depending on the results of the Hausman test) can be computed for model 1 as 
statistically, an endogenous variable for the natural log of the local government 
equitable share per capita is not needed. The results of this test are captured in 
Section 8.7 of this minor dissertation. 
5.3.6 Additional diagnostic tests undertaken 
In addition to the tests above, standard significance tests were run on the 
coefficients of both models to test for statistical significance of the coefficients. The 
null hypothesis of the statistical significance test of variable suggests that beta 
coefficient is equal to zero. In order to determine if the residuals were normally 
distributed a test of normality was conducted. A Skewness-kurtosis test was run, 
which is a variation of the Jarque Bera Test. The null hypothesis of this test states 
that residuals are normally distributed. A Ramsey reset test for misspecification 
was used on both models as test of endogeneity by way of an omitted variable 
bias. The null hypothesis for this test was that the model has no omitted variables.  
Multicollinearity occurs in a model when one variable is linear a function of one or 
more variables (Greenberg & Parks, 1997). In such instances, Stata cannot 
distinguish between each of these variables. One of the negative impacts of 
multicollinearity is that it prevents multiple regression from estimating coefficients, 
therefore making solving the equation difficult.  This may lead to unreliable 
deductions (Voss, 2004). The Variable Inflation Factors (VIF) test for 
multicollinearity is used in this study. There is no presence of multicollinearity if 
explanatory variables have a VIF of less than 10 (Murray, 2012). The results of this 
test are captured in Sections 8.8 to 8.10 of this minor dissertation. 
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5.4 Results on Model 1: Assessing the impact of Local Equitable Share 
on revenue generation 
Table 4: Model 1 estimation results 
Fixed Effects Model – 12-year Panel Data Model 
Dep Variable: Lngenrev (natural log of municipal own revenue per capita) 
Variables  Coefficient and (Robust Standard Errors) 
Lnlsgrnt 0.442** 
(0.205) 
Lndisic 0.427 
(0.588) 
Wrker 2.921 
(2.252) 
Wrkpop 5.117 
(6.285) 
Househ -0.818 
(2.931) 
Gini 0.288** 
(0.125) 
Penpop 31.341** 
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(24.860) 
Lngva -0.005 
(0.012) 
Constant 0.463 
(6.113) 
Observations (groups) 884(127) 
R-squared (within) 0.3 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
With reference to the first model’s results in the table above, the independent LES 
variable which represents the unconditional grant, is positively correlated with the 
municipal operating revenue dependent variable that captures a municipality’s own 
revenue generation ability. Not only is a positive relationship observed, but the 
unconditional grant variable is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, with the 
dependent variable, log of operating revenue per capita. According to the 
estimated results, a 1 percent increase in the local government equitable share 
increases a municipality’s own revenue by 0.4% on average. The results above 
differ from numerous studies that observe a negative correlation between 
intergovernmental transfers and municipal own revenue. In other words, municipal 
officials’ tendency to substitute local revenue mobilisation for intergovernmental 
transfers by easing on their tax collection activities (Cardenas & Sharma, 2009; 
Bravo, 2013) or offering tax breaks as the median voter theory postulates (Mogues 
& Benin, 2011). 
Another avenue that could link the positive relationship between local equitable 
share and municipal operating revenue is the notion of fiscal illusions. A fiscal 
illusion would suggest that a municipality’s constituent would have insufficient 
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information on intergovernmental transfers and how they are used by 
municipalities, therefore making poor estimations on the actual price and cost of a 
public good or service. Such information asymmetry leads to the constituents 
reacting by increasing their consumption and the subsequent demand of goods 
and services. This has the effect of increasing a municipality's operating revenue 
due to the signalling caused by increases in local government equitable share 
(Amusa et al, 2008; Mahabir, 2014). For one to be confident of the presence of a 
fiscal illusion, it is expected that the LES grant would also have a significant and 
positive correlation with municipal operating expenditure (Mahabir, 2014). The 
focus of this minor dissertation is on the municipal revenue side and its 
performance, therefore without assessment of impact of the LES grant on 
municipal expenditure - this is not conclusive. 
The result observed from the estimation is similar to those reported in studies of 
this nature in developing countries, where a statistically significant and positive 
relationship can be observed between unconditional grants and a municipality’s 
revenue (Caldeira and Rota-graziosi, 2014; Brun & El Khdari, 2016; Masaki, 2018). 
In these papers, the incentive effect was in play, i.e. when developing countries in 
these studies receive unconditional transfers, municipalities try to use it 
appropriately by improving their revenue mobilizing efforts through funding better 
tax administration and collection as opposed to substituting it with their revenue 
generating activities and collecting less tax revenue by easing on tax collection. 
Compared to similar studies above, the estimated results of model 1 of this minor 
dissertation seem to suggest that other factors, such as slower growth in the local 
economy better explain revenue generation efforts by municipalities than the LES, 
despite its increase over the period. 
It was expected that results would be similar to Mogues & Benin (2011), where, 
although intergovernmental grants are significantly correlated to municipal own 
revenue generation, this relationship is negative. Another reason why a negative 
correlation would be expected is that in studies where a positive correlation was 
observed between local revenue and the intergovernmental transfers, those grants 
often included a component in their design that incentivised a municipality’s 
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revenue mobilisation effort (Brun & El Khdari, 2016; Masaki, 2018). In a South 
African context, LES grant does not include a factor or component that speaks to 
revenue mobilisation in its allocation framework. Therefore, it would be expected 
that public officials at the local level would not be incentivized or highly motivated 
to collect tax revenue (Mogues & Benin, 2011) 
In terms of the other control variables in model 1, two overall observations can be 
made: most explanatory variables seem to convey the expected relationship to the 
dependent variable, but there is an issue of statistical significance amongst these 
variables. The variable that speaks to the total number of constituents above the 
age of 15 (working age) is positively correlated to the own revenue generation 
variable. The estimation indicates that a 1 percent increase in the working age 
population increases own revenue by approximately 5 percent on average. This 
variable is however, statistically insignificant. As one would expect, the variable 
that represented disposable income and spending power of a municipality’s 
constituents is positively correlated but statistically insignificant to municipality own 
revenue generation. It was estimated that a 1 percent increase in disposable 
income of constituents increases municipal own revenue by 0.24 percent. In 
contrast to the number of working age population in the municipality, the 
age65pluspercap variable observes the number of people above pension age. One 
would expect this variable to be negatively correlated to own revenue generation, 
but is positive in this case. The Gini coefficient variable is an indicator of inequality 
at a municipal level and is statistically significant and positively correlated to 
municipal operating revenue. The rest of the explanatory variables are all 
statistically insignificant in this case. 
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5.5 Results on Model 2: Assessing the impact of Local Equitable Share 
on municipal consumer debt 
Table 5: Model 2 estimation results 
Fixed Effects Model – 12-year Panel Data Model 
Dep Variable: Lndebt (natural log of municipal consumer debt per capita) 
Variables  Coefficient and (Robust Standard Error) 
Lnlsgrnt 
-0.112 
(0.244) 
Gaud 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
Unem 
-4.51 
(2.806) 
Noschl 
-25.211*** 
(7.938) 
Lninc 
0.498 
(0.524) 
Constant 4.536 
(3.047) 
Observations (groups) 318(121) 
R-squared (within) 0.4 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
The second model looked at the impact of the log of local equitable share per capita 
on municipal consumer debt per capita variable. The logic and rationale behind the 
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inclusion of this model is that one of the ways that fiscal dependency manifests 
itself in the case of local government is through tax collection efforts. Considering 
that municipal consumer debt largely includes the aggregate accumulation of 
uncollected taxes, the purpose of this additional model would be to reinforce or 
reject the relationship between intergovernmental grants on own revenue 
observed in model 1.  
While a positive correlation and statistically significant relationship was observed 
between the LES and municipal operating revenue, the estimated results for model 
1 reveal a negative correlation of municipal debt to unconditional grants. This 
correlation could suggest that, in part, the LES may have been used to reduce 
municipal consumer debt by improving tax revenue and debt collection 
administration and operations, which would result in increased operating revenue 
as model 1 may suggest. The LES could have also been used to support better 
financial and debt management practices by ensuring that local public officials 
write off bad debts as per their debt policy, thus reducing municipal consumer debt 
and improving debt practices.  
Another possible explanation of model 2 with respect to model 1 is that where the 
LES positively correlated to municipal own revenue, as observed in this minor 
dissertation, municipalities spend a portion of the grant on improving the quality of 
the services and goods that they provide. Because of the received improvements, 
tax and rate payers that were previously unwilling to pay the municipal consumer, 
settled some of their debt, therefore decreasing municipal revenue. While this may 
be true for some municipalities, the reality is that municipal consumer debt has 
been gradually increasing.  
This minor dissertation hypothesised that the unconditional grant creates a 
perverse incentive to collect less taxes through poor effort and thus increases 
overall municipal consumer debt. The results show that other factors have been 
more prominent in explaining increases in the municipal consumer debt than the 
LES. This means that in this context, municipal consumer debt does not function 
as a robust revenue performance indicator with respect to the impact of the LES 
on local revenue generation. Despite this peculiar sign, the unconditional grant 
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local equitable share variable is in any case statistically insignificant to municipal 
debt. 
Empirically and to the author’s best knowledge, no other similar study has aimed 
to test this relationship, therefore comparisons from a larger body of studies is not 
possible. In terms of the other control variables, only one was statistically 
significant to municipal consumer debt, the unemployment variable and the 
population that have never attended school. Despite its statistical significance, the 
sign for the no schooling variable is negative; one would expect a positive because 
it is hypothesised that the population of constituents with no schooling increases 
consumer debt by way of an increase in household and services debt. 
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6 Chapter 6: Conclusion and Policy Considerations 
The intention of this minor dissertation was to analyse whether fiscal dependency 
of local government on national government in the form of the LES - an 
unconditional grant - creates a perverse incentive to not collect taxes, thus acting 
as a substitute for generating own revenue. This minor dissertation also sought to   
analyse these results in the context of the observed decline in municipal operating 
revenue and increase in consumer debt in relation to the steady rise in the LES 
grant over the same period.  
Following appropriate diagnostic tests, the author went about this by estimating 
fixed effects models as a panel data estimation technique.  Two models were 
estimated: municipal revenue model and a municipal consumer debt model. The 
estimated results of the first model suggest that there is a positive relationship 
between the LES variable (as an unconditional grant) and a municipality’s own 
revenue. This finding is contrary to Mogues et al (2011) who found a negative 
relationship between intergovernmental transfer and own revenue generation due 
to a crowding out effect caused by the grant. What is interesting to note is that 
other developing countries in the continent where similar studies of fiscal 
dependency were conducted found a positive and significant relationship between 
intergovernmental transfers and own revenue generation (Caldeira and Rota-
graziosi, 2014; Brun & El Khdari, 2016; Masaki, 2018). These studies suggested a 
crowding in effect of the intergovernmental grant on own revenue generation, as 
these grants serve to encourage municipalities to mobilise additional funding to 
improve their revenue collection methods.  
Considering that own revenue of municipalities is increasing with the LES in South 
Africa, despite decreases in both property rates and service charge income, this is 
not a case of crowding in as the papers above suggest. The substitution effect 
could possibly be observed where intergovernmental transfers essentially replace 
own revenue (Tanzi, 1996; Cullis & Lewis, 1997). 
The second model that estimated the impact of LES on municipal debt intended to 
support the results of the first model, as well as confirm the hypothesis that falling 
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tax collection efforts which are shown by an increasing municipal consumer debt, 
have been a result of the LES grant. The results, however, are statistically 
insignificant at all levels. There are no relevant empirical studies of this particular 
question, but in a South African setting, the evidence suggests that the fact that 
the LES grant has failed to explain the rise in municipal consumer debt over this 
time, indicates the strong possibility of additional detrimental issues. Given that 
municipal debt management has become an increasingly debilitating issue with a 
lot of municipalities unable to undertake their core mandate as a result, this topic 
definitely needs substantial and continuous further research to understand the 
behaviour of the municipality, both as a debtor and creditor, as well as their 
interaction with their wide spectrum of consumers.  
With regards to policy, the design of the conditional and unconditional fiscal 
transfer plays an important role in how municipalities behave. Despite the 
autonomy that comes with unconditional grants, national government would expect 
municipal officials to act in the interests that serve the long-term viability as well as 
the multi-faceted needs of the constituent. The status quo clearly indicates that this 
is not the case. National government as providers of intergovernmental grants 
need to be more mindful of the direct and indirect incentive effects of the grants 
that they provide municipalities. More planning needs to be done towards creating 
a strong theory of change or log frame that speaks to each grant, explaining the 
motivation of the grant, as well the desired outcome and impacts and undesirable 
ones (including how to mitigate them).  
As chapter 2 of this study indicates, the Local Government Equitable Share Grant 
is in its third iteration. Although it is positive that the grant has evolved to reflect 
changes in South Africa’s local government environment, the issues and 
weaknesses that affected the first iteration still prevail in varying degrees. This 
further strengthens the case for a comprehensive theory of change or log frame 
model. The intergovernmental grant log frame models ought to be evaluated 
periodically to test if their objectives led to their desired outcomes. Given the 
vertical fiscal imbalances and the need for better equalisation amongst 
municipalities that are expected to supply the same basic services, there will 
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always be a need for intergovernmental transfers. National government should 
seek to improve more efficient use of these grants in municipalities through 
capacity building and filling key vacancies in municipalities.  Debt collection, 
financial management and integrated planning are key activities municipalities 
need to perform in relation to better grant management and execution. Without 
proper staffing complement, these activities will be poorly performed with 
potentially detrimental effects in the long run.  
Better intergovernmental communication is needed as municipalities need to be 
clearer about their hiring and training needs. National government, through the 
Departments of Labour, and Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs must 
work closely with municipalities on their unique challenges and opportunities - 
tailored intervention plans must be developed. Some additional high-level 
recommendations in this regard would be ensuring public consultation and buy in 
with regards to the policy around debt collection, partnerships with training 
providers, and tertiary institutions for the financial and governance training for 
municipality officials. 
Although the second model found statistical insignificance between the LES share 
and municipal consumer debt, declining and poor tax collection efforts are 
observed by the increase in municipal consumer debt over time. Intergovernmental 
transfers, particularly unconditional grants, should include incentives that speak to 
tax collecting efforts. National government should reward well documented 
evidence by a combination of quarterly reports and financial evidence that shows 
that municipalities have endeavoured to fulfil their tax collecting efforts, given their 
unique capacity and infrastructure constraints. 
This minor dissertation advocates for stricter guidelines and strong incentives 
structure when it comes to intergovernmental transfers to municipalities. A good 
example of positive fiscal incentives in order to incentivise own revenue generation 
can be found in the case of Brun & El Khdari (2016) where they observe that the 
Morrocan government includes a tax effort and revenue mobilising indicator within 
their formula for unconditional grant transfer to municipalities, as well as publicly 
announcing that the greater the tax effort of the municipality, the greater the share 
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of unconditional grant is received.  
It is important to be mindful in conducting panel data analysis as concerns may 
arise through the use of various sources of data in creating a combined dataset. 
Given that different methodologies were used to develop the different data points, 
this then suggests varying quality of municipal data estimations. One of the areas 
that this can be observed is in non-financial municipal data. Given the self-reporting 
nature of this data, the quality of the data largely depends on the capacity within 
the municipality. It would be ideal if such data was readily available from a 
centralised source, or a source verified by national government, similar to 
developed countries across the globe that partake in such research, as risks and 
variation associated in using data from multiple sources are mitigated or limited. 
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8 Appendix 1 – Diagnostic Tests 
8.1 Testing for Heteroskedasticity 
Figure 10:Testing for heteroskedasticity in model 1 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
Figure 11: Testing for heteroskedasticity in model 2 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
8.2 Testing for Serial Autocorrelation 
Figure 12: Testing for serial autocorrelation in model 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
Figure 13: Testing for serial autocorrelation in model 2 
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Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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8.3 Testing for Random Effects – Model 1 
Figure 14: Estimating Pooled OLS for Model 1 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
Figure 15: Estimating Random Effects for model 1 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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Figure 16: Estimating LM test for model 1 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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8.4 Testing for Random Effects - Model 2 
Figure 17: Estimating Pooled OLS for model 2 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
Figure 18: Estimating random effects for model 2 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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Figure 19: Estimating LM Test for model 2 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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8.5 Hausman test – Model 1 
Figure 20: Estimate fixed effects model and store results - model 1 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
Figure 21: Estimate random effects model and store the results - model 1 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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Figure 22: Compute Hausman test 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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8.6 Hausman test – Model 2 
Figure 23: Estimate fixed effects model and store the results 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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Figure 24: Estimate random effects model and store the results 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
Figure 25: Compute Hausman test 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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8.7 Testing for endogeneity in model 1 
Figure 26: Step 1 and 2, estimating model with suspected variable and storing residuals 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
Figure 27: Step 3, estimation original regression model using saved residual as additional control variable 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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Figure 28: Step 4, compute augmented regression test 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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8.8 Testing multicollinearity 
Figure 29: Vector inflation factor - model 1 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
Figure 30: Vector inflation factor - model 2 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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8.9 Testing for normality 
Figure 31: Skewness/kurtosis test - Model 1 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
Figure 32: Skewness/kurtosis test - Model 2 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
 
 
8.10 Testing for misspecification 
Figure 33: Ramsey reset test - model 1 
 
Figure 34: Ramsey reset test - model 2 
 
 
 
  Page 94 of 113 
  
 
 
  Page 95 of 113 
9 Appendix 2: Scatter Plots 
9.1 Model 1 
Figure 35: Own Revenue on LGES 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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Figure 36: Own revenue on disposable income 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
Figure 37: Own revenue on total employed 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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Figure 38:Own revenue on population above 16 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
Figure 39: Own revenue on total formal households 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
.6 .65 .7 .75 .8
pop15percap
95% CI Fitted values
logoprevpcap
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
formhousepercap
95% CI Fitted values
logoprevpcap
 
 
  Page 98 of 113 
Figure 40: Own revenue on pension population 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
Figure 41: Own revenue on GVA 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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9.2 Model 2 
Figure 42: Municipal consumer debt on unemployed population 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
Figure 43: Municipal consumer debt on population with no schooling 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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Figure 44: Municipal consumer debt on personal income 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
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10 Appendix 3: Regression Outputs 
10.1 Model 1 
Figure 45: Fixed effects for model 1 
 
Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
10.2 Model 2 
Figure 46: Fixed effects for model 2 
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Source: Authors own Analysis using Stata 13 
11 Appendix 4: Municipalities studied 
The table below provides a full list of the names and location of the municipalities 
used in the 12-year panel dataset. The list contains a mixture of local and 
metropolitan municipalities. As stated in previous chapters, all municipalities in the 
table below provide the four basic services contained in the Constitution – water, 
electricity, refuse and sewage. 
Table 6: List of all municipalities used in this study 
Name Province  District 
Baviaans Eastern Cape Cacadu District Municipality 
Blue Crane Route Eastern Cape Cacadu District Municipality 
Buffalo City Eastern Cape Amatole District Municipality 
Camdeboo Eastern Cape Cacadu District Municipality 
Ikwezi Eastern Cape Cacadu District Municipality 
Kouga Eastern Cape Cacadu District Municipality 
Koukamma Eastern Cape Cacadu District Municipality 
Makana Eastern Cape Cacadu District Municipality 
Ndlambe Eastern Cape Cacadu District Municipality 
Nelson Mandela Eastern Cape Nelson Mandela 
Sundays River Valley Eastern Cape Cacadu District Municipality 
Dihlabeng Free State Thabo Mofutsanyana District Municipality 
Kopanong Free State Xhariep District Municipality 
Letsemeng Free State Xhariep District Municipality 
Mafube Free State Fezile Dabi District Municipality 
Maluti-a-Phofung Free State Thabo Mofutsanyana District Municipality 
Mangaung Free State Motheo District Municipality 
Mantsopa Free State Motheo District Municipality 
Masilonyana Free State Lejweleputswa District Municipality 
Matjhabeng Free State Lejweleputswa District Municipality 
Metsimaholo Free State Fezile Dabi District Municipality 
Mohokare Free State Xhariep District Municipality 
Moqhaka Free State Fezile Dabi District Municipality 
Nala Free State Lejweleputswa District Municipality 
Naledi (Fs) Free State Motheo District Municipality 
Ngwathe Free State Fezile Dabi District Municipality 
Nketoana Free State Thabo Mofutsanyana District Municipality 
Phumelela Free State Thabo Mofutsanyana District Municipality 
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Name Province  District 
Setsoto Free State Thabo Mofutsanyana District Municipality 
Tokologo Free State Lejweleputswa District Municipality 
Tswelopele Free State Lejweleputswa District Municipality 
City of Johannesburg Gauteng City of Johannesburg 
City of Tshwane Gauteng City of Tshwane 
Ekurhuleni Gauteng Ekurhuleni 
Emfuleni Gauteng Sedibeng District Municipality 
Lesedi Gauteng Sedibeng District Municipality 
Midvaal Gauteng Sedibeng District Municipality 
Mogale City Gauteng West Rand District Municipality 
Randfontein Gauteng West Rand District Municipality 
Westonaria Gauteng West Rand District Municipality 
eThekwini KwaZulu-Natal eThekwini 
Msunduzi KwaZulu-Natal uMgungundlovu District Municipality 
Newcastle KwaZulu-Natal Amajuba District Municipality 
uMhlathuze KwaZulu-Natal uThungulu District Municipality 
Bela Bela Limpopo Waterberg District Municipality 
Lephalale Limpopo Waterberg District Municipality 
Modimolle Limpopo Waterberg District Municipality 
Mogalakwena Limpopo Waterberg District Municipality 
Mookgopong Limpopo Waterberg District Municipality 
Polokwane Limpopo Capricorn District Municipality 
Thabazimbi Limpopo Waterberg District Municipality 
Albert Luthuli Mpumalanga Gert Sibande District Municipality 
Bushbuckridge Mpumalanga Ehlanzeni District Municipality 
Delmas Mpumalanga Nkangala District Municipality 
Dipaleseng Mpumalanga Gert Sibande District Municipality 
Dr JS Moroka Mpumalanga Nkangala District Municipality 
Emakhazeni Mpumalanga Nkangala District Municipality 
Emalahleni (Mp) Mpumalanga Nkangala District Municipality 
Govan Mbeki Mpumalanga Gert Sibande District Municipality 
Lekwa Mpumalanga Gert Sibande District Municipality 
Mbombela Mpumalanga Ehlanzeni District Municipality 
Mkhondo Mpumalanga Gert Sibande District Municipality 
Msukaligwa Mpumalanga Gert Sibande District Municipality 
Nkomazi Mpumalanga Ehlanzeni District Municipality 
Pixley Ka Seme Mpumalanga Gert Sibande District Municipality 
Steve Tshwete Mpumalanga Nkangala District Municipality 
Thaba Chweu Mpumalanga Ehlanzeni District Municipality 
Thembisile Mpumalanga Nkangala District Municipality 
Umjindi Mpumalanga Ehlanzeni District Municipality 
City of Matlosana North West Southern District Municipality 
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Kgetlengrivier North West Bojanala Platinum District Municipality 
Madibeng North West Bojanala Platinum District Municipality 
Maquassi Hills North West Southern District Municipality 
Merafong City North West Southern District Municipality 
Moretele North West Bojanala Platinum District Municipality 
Moses Kotane North West Bojanala Platinum District Municipality 
Rustenburg North West Bojanala Platinum District Municipality 
Tlokwe North West Southern District Municipality 
Ventersdorp North West Southern District Municipality 
!Kai! Garib Northern Cape Siyanda District Municipality 
!Kheis Northern Cape Siyanda District Municipality 
//Khara Hais Northern Cape Siyanda District Municipality 
Emthanjeni Northern Cape Karoo District Municipality 
Gammagara Northern Cape Kgalagadi District Municipality 
Ga-Segonyana Northern Cape Kgalagadi District Municipality 
Hantam Northern Cape Namakwa District Municipality 
Kamiesberg Northern Cape Namakwa District Municipality 
Kareeberg Northern Cape Karoo District Municipality 
Karoo Hoogland Northern Cape Namakwa District Municipality 
Kgatelopele Northern Cape Siyanda District Municipality 
Khai-Ma Northern Cape Namakwa District Municipality 
Mier Northern Cape Siyanda District Municipality 
Nama Khoi Northern Cape Namakwa District Municipality 
Renosterberg Northern Cape Karoo District Municipality 
Richtersveld Northern Cape Namakwa District Municipality 
Siyancuma Northern Cape Karoo District Municipality 
Siyathemba Northern Cape Karoo District Municipality 
Sol Plaatje Northern Cape Frances Baard District Municipality 
Thembelihle Northern Cape Karoo District Municipality 
Tsantsabane Northern Cape Siyanda District Municipality 
Ubuntu Northern Cape Karoo District Municipality 
Umsobomvu Northern Cape Karoo District Municipality 
Beaufort West Western Cape Central Karoo District Municipality 
Bergrivier Western Cape West Coast District Municipality 
Bitou Western Cape Eden District Municipality 
Breede River Winelands Western Cape Cape Winelands District Municipality 
Breede Valley Western Cape Cape Winelands District Municipality 
Cape Agulhas Western Cape Overberg District Municipality 
Cederberg Western Cape West Coast District Municipality 
City of Cape Town Western Cape City of Cape Town 
Drakenstein Western Cape Cape Winelands District Municipality 
George Western Cape Eden District Municipality 
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Hessequa Western Cape Eden District Municipality 
Kannaland Western Cape Eden District Municipality 
Knysna Western Cape Eden District Municipality 
Laingsburg Western Cape Central Karoo District Municipality 
Matzikama Western Cape West Coast District Municipality 
Mossel Bay Western Cape Eden District Municipality 
Oudtshoorn Western Cape Eden District Municipality 
Overstrand Western Cape Overberg District Municipality 
Prince Albert Western Cape Central Karoo District Municipality 
Saldanha Bay Western Cape West Coast District Municipality 
Stellenbosch Western Cape Cape Winelands District Municipality 
Swartland Western Cape West Coast District Municipality 
Swellendam Western Cape Overberg District Municipality 
Theewaterskloof Western Cape Overberg District Municipality 
Witzenberg Western Cape Cape Winelands District Municipality 
 
